



**STATE, REFUGEES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY:
TRANSFORMATION UNDER CONTROL***

**TÜRKİYE'DE DEVLET, MÜLTECİLER VE SİVİL
TOPLUM: KONTROL ALTINDAKİ DÖNÜŞÜM**

Birce ALTIOK*

ABSTRACT

The forced migration movement from Syria, which began in 2011, has brought about significant changes in civil society within Turkey. The already existing complex relationship between the state and civil society, is further diversified in the context of forced migration, presenting the need to focus on the provision of humanitarian assistance, access to services, and integration of Syrian refugees who are legally under temporary protection, without international refugee recognition. Furthermore, state-driven cross-border humanitarian operations and security-oriented state policies also shape this landscape. Therefore, the interplay between civil society actors –existing, government-supported, and newly emerging– and security-oriented state policies contributes to this transformation. Historical and political realities, alongside global-local crises, influence the trajectory of change within civil society, positioning authorities as pivotal decision-makers in managing individuals' movement. Through in-depth interviews in different cities of Turkey with NGOs and refugee-led civil society members in 2018, the article uncovers the formation and progression of relationships

* Ethics committee approval was obtained for this study from Koç University Ethics Committee for Social Sciences for the periods spanning from March 25, 2015, to 2016, and from June 13, 2017, to 2018 (one-year periods), under protocol number 2015.076.IRB3.034.

* Ph.D., Koç University Migration Research Center (MiReKoc), baltiok@ku.edu.tr, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7307-6589>

* Makale Geliş Tarihi / Article Received: 15.12.2023
Makale Kabul Tarihi / Article Accepted: 07.02.2024

between civil society actors and the state, revealing adaptations and adjustments based on contextual circumstances. The article seeks to move beyond comprehensive liberal and developmental perspectives, instead focusing on the evolving dynamics of state control within migration-related civil society.

Keywords: Turkey, Civil Society, Forced Migration, State Control, Humanitarian Assistance.

ÖZ

2011 yılında başlayan Suriye'den zorunlu göç hareketi Türkiye'deki sivil toplumda önemli değişiklikleri beraberinde getirdi. Zorunlu göç bağlamında devlet ile sivil toplum arasındaki karmaşık ilişki; insani yardım, hizmetlere erişimin kolaylaştırılması ve uluslararası mülteci statüsü olmayan geçici koruma altındaki Suriyeli mültecilerin entegrasyonu dahil olmak üzere farklı düzeylerde farklı yaklaşımlarla ele alındı. Bu süreçte ayrıca sınır ötesi insani yardım operasyonları da bu ilişkinin şekillenmesinde rol oynadı. Dolayısıyla hükümet destekli olan ya da olmayan sivil toplum aktörleri ile güvenlik odaklı devlet politikaları arasındaki etkileşim sivil toplumdaki dönüşüme önemli katkıda bulunduğu bahsedilebilir. Bu makale Türkiye vakası özelinde, küresel-yerel krizlerin tarihsel ve politik gerçeklerle birlikte ele alındığında merkezi otoritenin ve politikalarının bireylerin hareketliliğini yönetmede önemli karar alıcılar haline gelmesine ve sivil toplumdaki değişimin gidişatını nasıl etkilediğine değinmektedir. Makale, Türkiye'nin çeşitli şehirlerinde 2018 yılında STK'lar ve mültecilerin dahil olduğu sivil toplum üyeleriyle gerçekleşen derinlemesine görüşmeler aracılığıyla sivil toplum aktörleri ile devlet arasındaki ilişkilerin oluşumu ve değişimini ele almaktadır. Bahsi geçen bağlamsal koşullara dayalı uyarlamalara ve düzenlemelere odaklanmaktadır. Böylelikle bu makale, kapsamlı liberal ve kalkınmacı bakış açılarının ötesine geçmeyi amaçlayarak, göçle ilişkili sivil toplumdaki devlet kontrolünün evrilen dinamiklerine değinmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Sivil Toplum, Zorunlu Göç, Devlet Kontrolü, Dönüşüm, İnsani Yardım.

INTRODUCTION

The migration phenomenon offers numerous examples of collaboration between the state and civil society in a globalized context lacking a coherent global governance regime. When examining cases of mass forced migration, where humanitarian assistance and emergency situations coexist, the limitations of state channels may require the involvement of non-state actors. This issue is part of a broader global problem, leading to crisis responses at the local level, with policies varying depending on the actors involved. Furthermore, as the protracted mass refugee flow continues, services and policies need to address additional aspects such as integration, labor market access, housing, education, and healthcare. The relationship between the state and non-state actors is complex and multifaceted, displaying variations across cases that can be categorized as exclusionary, interest-oriented, collaborative, or state-controlled (Miller et al., 2009).

Understanding this disparity requires considering the engagement of different actors but also the need to include the security debate, as migration is often perceived as a potential security threat within the framework of national security (Garkisch et al., 2017; Betts, 2011; Koser, 2010; Keyman and İçduygu, 2003; Weiner, 1996; Miller, 1997). In that sense, the case of Turkey serves as an insightful example to demonstrate the state's cooperation with specific non-state actors with the visible role of security dilemma involved. Since the start of the arrival of Syrian refugees¹ in 2011, there has been a growing number of grassroots movements and initiatives led by civil society groups, particularly after 2015. These new organizations have been actively engaging with the government at various levels, alongside already established civil society groups and international organizations (Soykan and Şenses, 2018; Boşnak, 2021; Sert and Daniş, 2021). After 2016, the rate of this trend decreased because of societal polarization, the impact of COVID-19, and the attempted coup d'état in 2016. However, interactions among different groups still exist, albeit with challenges (Doğan and Genç, 2021; Adar and Püttmann, 2022).

This study is important as it investigates the interactions between states and non-state actors, specifically focusing on forced migration. It utilizes data from across Turkey, involving members of civil society, state institutions, and migrants concurrently. The focus lies on understanding why states cooperate differently with non-state actors and the roles these actors play within the migration context. The topic is chosen and focused to shed light on the evolving relationship between

¹ In this study, the term “refugee” is used not to denote legal status but rather to describe the nature of the movement, as referenced in academic literature. Syrian refugee groups are categorized under temporary refugee protection rather than international protection as stipulated by international law, while in other cases, although few in comparison, they may hold either Turkish citizenship or residential permits.

the Turkish state and various non-state actors amidst the Syrian refugee crisis. It aims to understand how state policies have adapted to address security concerns alongside humanitarian efforts, especially after 2015 when the possibility of refugee groups returning diminished. Overall, the study aims to contribute to civil society and migration studies by addressing the limited responses to mass refugee flows and offering insights into how states collaborate with non-state actors amid forced migration crises, thus shedding light on deeply rooted issues within migration governance.

Following this introduction, the second part of the study provides a historical overview of the state-civil society relationship in Turkey. The third part of the study introduces the theoretical framework, focusing on the global-local crisis dynamics that have placed migration governance primarily in the hands of authorities. Moving on to the fourth part, the study delves into the analysis. The analysis highlights three main themes: the collaborative characteristics between certain non-state actors and the state, the role of diaspora or protracted refugee groups in influencing dynamics, and how non-state actors interpret and adapt to state policies. In the conclusion, a summary of the findings is provided, along with concluding remarks and recommendations for future research.

1. STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

The relationship between civil society and the state in Turkey has been fraught with challenges. Throughout history, the dominance of the state has led to its governance, control, and suppression of civil society as necessary (Atalay, 2018). In recent times marked by multiple coup d'états, the state gained even more power through the 1982 Constitution following the 1980 military coup. During this period, over twenty thousand non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were forcibly closed due to their perceived "undesirable" activities (Şimşek, 2006). After the 1983 elections, despite the state's continued grip on associational life, right-wing parties fostered closer ties with civil society, driven by neoliberal, democratic, and nationalist ideologies (Mert, 2022). The 1990s witnessed a rise in the visibility of political Islam within civil society, with political Islamists actively engaging in democratic rights and religious freedoms through NGOs (Yerasimoz, 2001). Although the state exerted relatively less pressure on civil society during the 1990s compared to the 1980s, it still sought to limit and control civil society's actions, impeding its autonomy due to political polarization (Şimşek, 2006; Doyle, 2017).

The 1990s also displayed a period of the rise of the Kurdish movement and the state's continued systematic pressure on civil society (Özçetin and Özer, 2015). Paradoxically, autonomous NGOs have also developed to stand against state oppression and arbitrary administration (Ibid). Especially following the 1999

Helsinki Summit of 11-12 December, civil society entities grew significantly within the context of the European Union (EU) process and received EU support (Diez et al., 2005). The electoral success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a supporter of EU policies, led to their victory in the 2002 general elections and a focus on the development of civil society, particularly emphasizing religious freedoms and political gains (Özçetin and Özer, 2015). Atalay highlights this development in an instrumentalist way and defines the government's use of the civil society sphere for clientelist purposes as "colonizing the civil society sphere," where the "loyal and compliant segments of the civil society were rewarded," and dissenting or critical voices were excluded, marginalized, and even criminalized (Atalay, 2018). Aligned with the government's agenda to "exercise socioeconomic hegemony and consolidate the authoritarian neoliberal regime," the government restructured the state apparatus and integrated loyalist nonstate actors, such as Islamic segments of civil society, into governance (Ibid). Consequently, due to these political, economic, and electoral gains, socially conservative and Islamic civil society organizations (CSOs) have been openly supported and granted access to state resources (Ibid).

However, the AKP's oscillation between democratic freedoms and authoritarian tendencies became even more pronounced after the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. This event led to the disruption of policies that had been developed in conjunction with civil society, primarily due to security concerns. While the state of emergency resulted in the severance of the state's relations with civil society, it also paved the way for a new phase, compelling the state to collaborate with more dependable non-state entities. Subsequently, this recent period has introduced further restrictions that curtailed freedom of association, the right to assemble, and freedom of expression (TÜSEV Report, 2017; Özçetin and Özer, 2015). As a consequence, the domain of civil society has begun to shrink, while governmental control over civil society has grown.

Yet, one has to differentiate non-state actors with political associations from others with humanitarian agendas. In times of crisis, the civil society actors may rise. In the recent history of Turkey, the governments have supported more dynamism in civil society when it comes to emergency situations, understanding well that the state's humanitarian aid networks cannot handle the problem alone. The devastating 1999 earthquakes that occurred in the Marmara Region on August 17 and in Düzce on November 12 were two tragic events that the Turkish state could not adequately respond to. These situations have made room for the belief that a more participatory political culture is necessary for Turkish society to produce adequate and practical solutions to respond to the need for better humanitarian assistance (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). Yet, centralization of emergency relief efforts under the premises of the state remained the primary

policy to deliver aid, even though the number of civil society entities has increased over time.² The same increase in terms of capacity is also valid for the state's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and the Turkish Red Crescent since 1999.

2. CENTERING MIGRATION IN STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS

The mass migration of refugees represents a crucial emergency situation that demands the engagement of non-governmental actors and strategic planning by the state. This planning includes aspects such as providing assistance, ensuring security, and addressing both internal and international dynamics. As stated in the literature, the provision of services in collaboration with non-state actors to facilitate the accommodation and well-being of migrants contributes to the sustainability and facilitation of general social welfare (Wilson and Post, 2013; Garkisch et al., 2017). This leads to short, medium, and long-term planning involving different civil society initiatives to respond to changing needs, such as those providing humanitarian aid and others supporting refugee integration. Therefore, the protracted situation may require a more dynamic civil society based on need, financial availability, and in centralized states, also to what extent the civil society actors are allowed to support and cooperate with the state.

Having mentioned the Turkish state's view of civil society with prioritization of securitization and state interest in cooperating with trusted entities, Turkey's reactions to different mass refugee movements have displayed similar trends linking migration with the security threat. The state followed a compulsory camp policy in the mass refugee movement from Iraq to Turkey in 1991. In a short time, a safe zone was created in Northern Iraq with an international operation, and as a result, the refugees returned quickly (Altiook and Tosun, 2020). This refugee movement from Northern Iraq was one of the last refugee movements in which Turkey kept international aid limited to the campsites, and the state allowed a limited number of local NGOs to take part together with the state entities. In 1989, the state and NGOs met on common ground in the face of the mass refugee movement of Turks from Bulgaria. They displayed a more organized civil society mobilization when the political agenda facilitated the integration of "cognates" who came to the homeland (Ibid). In comparing the two refugee movements, it can be mentioned that Turkey's ontological security, identity politics, and citizenship policies played a role. As a result, different levels of involvement took place by non-state actors (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). However, it should be noted that NGOs working with other migrant and refugee groups were very limited back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One reason for this was related to

² The same centralization efforts for emergency relief also apply to the Kahramanmaraş earthquake that took place on February 6 in 2023.

the limited resources and the low number of migrants residing in the country, and more importantly, the migration agenda was considered relatively unimportant (İçduygu, 2018). Another reason that can be asserted is that the state did not have comprehensive legislation and a functional migration agenda to cooperate with civil society in the migration field (Ibid).

After 2011, the civil war in Syria triggered the largest refugee movement since World War II. In addition to internally displaced people in Syria, refugees mostly fled to neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt and Iraq. Since 2014, Turkey has hosted the largest number of refugees in the world. Currently, according to data from the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) (formerly known as the Directorate General of Migration Management), the number of Syrians registered under temporary protection status in Turkey is more than 3.1 million (Presidency of Migration Management, 2024). The number of individuals under international protection is approximately 30 thousand, and as of December 2022, the count of migrants with Turkish residency stands at 1.3 million (Ibid). As the influx of refugees continued due to the civil war in Syria, especially between 2013 and 2017, irregular crossings reached their peak on the Greek islands in 2015. Consequently, the internationalization of the Syrian refugee issue expanded beyond the borders of neighboring countries. The EU began to offer financial support to the state and NGOs in Turkey through various projects and grants, which in turn contributed to the development of a civil society industry.³ The politicization of the issue by European actors who aimed to utilize Turkey as a gatekeeper to prevent irregular migration to the European continent prompted both new and existing civil society actors to align and integrate their services for refugees, with many of them establishing close cooperation with the state. Consequently, a significant increase in the number of non-state actors occurred (Paker, 2019).

As the number of civil society actors increased, they began to play a vital role, primarily in the fields of humanitarian assistance and integration (Barn, 2021). However, the historical persistence of a security-driven approach to civic initiatives, coupled with the state's political agenda, has hindered the emergence of an advocacy-oriented and independent civic agenda (see International Crisis Group, 2018). However, as articulated in some studies, state oversight from above through various state channels remains a reality for many CSOs. The state seeks

³ The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, managing a total of €6 billion (€3 billion for 2016-2017 and €3 billion for 2018-2019), provides for a joint coordination mechanism, designed to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities in Turkey are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The Facility focuses on humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support. List of projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed can be found at the EU portal (European Commission, 2019).

to obtain information about their activities, actors, and communication channels (Paker, 2019). In their report, Mackreath and Sağınç define the interaction between the state and NGOs as a negotiation table where those in power present their differing political and existential struggles (2017). However, this struggle presented both challenges and opportunities within migration-related civil society (Zihnioğlu and Dalkıran, 2022). There was a noticeable shift in focus towards migration-related issues, but at the same time, competition and struggle intensified. Some initiatives were strategically aligned with the political agenda of the state while still providing services, while others within the migration industry competed for funding. As a result, some initiatives flourished while others faced development hurdles.

3. THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The processes of globalization have led to the realization that state-centric approaches no longer suffice in explaining or addressing societal problems. As the globalization perspective weakens the influence of state-centric approaches and introduces the concept of the global-local nexus, a variety of global crises emerges, spanning from environmental to economic challenges. These crises are often accompanied by conflicts between local and international elements, encompassing factors such as ethnicity, race, religion, and identity (Shaw, 1994). Consequently, nation-states find themselves ill-equipped to manage these inherently global societal problems (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). Within this dynamic interplay between the local and the global, national security concerns intersect with the governance of migration, both of which are inherent issues in a globalized world (Miller, 1997). This interaction places civil society actors in a unique position—functioning as service providers, advocates of rights and aid, while also being entities that must navigate their relationships with the state, and vice versa.

The tension between the global and the local also provides a valid rationale for the objectives that civil society strives to achieve, given that their role in democratization and development remains uncertain, as articulated by Jean L. Cohen,

what is missing is a systematic and careful reflection about the ways in which globalization has transformed the fundamental parameters of civil society and how this change affects the potential impact of civil society in national, regional and transnational structures. Without a meticulous reflection, we lack the tools to perceive what is new and what is possible, and we run the risk of overloading the concept of civil society with regulatory and democratizing functions that it probably cannot fulfill. (Cohen, 2003, cited in Ramos, 2006: 144)

The complex role of civil society in the twentieth century and the evolution of dynamics from local to global contexts can be attributed, in part, to the necessity of establishing a coherent global governance framework for migration. This stands in contrast to the financial and trade regimes that oversee the global political economy (Ramos, 2006; Betts, 2011; Koser, 2010). Branka Likić-Brborić's study, which examines the progression towards integrating migration into the discourse of global development policy, illustrates how these asymmetrical governance structures contribute to the "marginalization of a rights-based approach to migration" and instead emphasize business-friendly migration management and geopolitical security priorities (2018). Similarly, the Syrian war and other prolonged crises in the MENA region underscore the absence of functional governance mechanisms to address ongoing irregular migration and mass movements of refugees. This void results in policy formulation and implementation being controlled by authoritative entities, while the global neoliberal order perpetuates existing vulnerabilities and sustains precarious conditions (Ibid).

As a consequence of the absence of effective migration governance, the interaction between nation-states and civil society becomes crucial. Within this framework, states employ various modes of governance to address migration movements, either by adapting existing policy norms or creating new methods. This context underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to civil society studies, which highlights that the contribution of civil society to development and democratization is constrained.

The theoretical discourse in this study navigates the spectrum of civil society studies, encompassing Gramscian and Tocquevillian perspectives, while also acknowledging a more controlled and security-oriented trajectory. Gramsci diverged from Tocqueville in his interpretation of civil society. Tocqueville saw civil society as a means of self-governance and citizen awareness, while Gramsci saw civil society as a battleground that is far from normative evaluations and contains opportunities for all kinds of political positions. Gramsci suggests that this strategy allows authoritarian regimes to maintain their power and strengthen their positions over time (Oğuz, 2018). Therefore, instead of exclusively linking civil society to democratization and development, this study embraces a perspective closer to Gramsci's logic without completely dismissing other progressive aspects. For instance, authoritarian regimes resist foreign funding to civil society because they fear losing control and see independent institutions as threats (see Matchanka, 2014; Wiktorowicz, 2000; Ibid). Thus, civil society's effectiveness depends on these power struggles. However, it is worth noting that this oversight and control can also create opportunities for progress, such as better governance and increased diversity of voices in politics and society. As Foster

(2001) contends, associations are often utilized by state agencies to achieve specific goals rather than control society. They offer insights into the state's governance system and reflect efforts by different parts of the state and society to achieve various objectives.

One facet of the theoretical framework in this study draws from existing literature concerning the state's capacity and intent to regulate the civic space. This control is not just about merging it with a clientelist relationship (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997; Collier and Collier, 1991) or solely with a conflict perspective (Callaghy, 1984; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994; Stepan 1978) but in between of engendering insecurities while distinguishing between reliable and unreliable non-state actors, in some cases using a Schmittian logic of friendliness and hostility, and at the same time, forming a functional governance mechanism (Foster, 2001). The security dimension emerges due to forced migration, which is inherently intertwined with a globalized world. Alongside the historical complexities of countries like Turkey, characterized by a paradoxical and distant relationship with non-state actors, the ontological insecurity escalates due to a surge in the number of NGOs and CSOs following the forced migration from Syria.

The state's engagement with non-state actors does not imply absolute control; on the contrary, its interaction with civil society entities allows for specific engagements and adjustments. This dynamic affords the state the capacity to reshape the civic sphere through collaborations with entities it deems reliable. This encompasses both longstanding CSOs and recently formed ones. As detailed in the analysis section below, it also explores how the state encourages the establishment of initiatives led by refugees and diaspora communities. This is often in exchange for their continued involvement in cases that involve changing rights and services offered to various groups over time (see İközöğlü Erensu, 2016; İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018). However, the proliferation of national and international non-governmental organizations operating in the volatile region neighboring Syria has led to the perception that Kurdish rebel groups, Islamists, and other factions pose legitimate threats to national security. Consequently, the implementation of policies within the civic sphere prompts state reactions that historically have involved conflicts with civil society, compelling the state to adopt a more security-oriented approach when assessing the situation.

Thus, the theoretical segment of this study takes into consideration the state's ontological approach to the migration-security-control nexus as a valid tool. It also recognizes the broader transformative role that the nation-state assumes while responding to population movements, encompassing the historical and structural realities that have long shaped the relationship between the state and civil society. Without dismissing the insecurities and the absence of global governance for the mass migration movement, this chapter presents empirical

findings at the state, civil society, and agent levels. Simultaneously, it adheres to a theoretical model that is interconnected with structural limitations yet maintains the potential for transformation under state influence.

Using qualitative methods, the data collected for this study was obtained through interviews with 72 service providers who offered information, advice, guidance, or services to refugees, asylum seekers, and others under temporary protection in Turkey. Fieldwork was conducted in 11 provinces during the summer of 2018, including Izmir, Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, Samsun, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Van, Mersin, Antalya, and Konya. The selection of provinces followed specific criteria: they included areas with high concentrations of SuTP (Syrians under temporary protection) across different regions of Turkey, as well as satellite cities with asylum-seekers under international protection. Provinces like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir were chosen for their experienced service providers and developed migrant support systems. Additionally, provinces like Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep, located in the border region with Syria, were selected due to the rapid development of migrant support systems over the past seven years. Other criteria included the prevalence of seasonal agricultural labor in provinces like Mersin, high numbers of SuTP in cities like Bursa and Samsun, and the presence of various migrant communities in cities like Konya and Antalya. The province of Van, which shares a border with Iran and experiences intense irregular migration, was also included.

The interviewees included humanitarian workers, social workers, and activists, primarily from local communities and reflecting gender balance. However, a smaller subset consisted of Syrian refugees either under temporary protection or residing in Turkey under work or residence permits. They were affiliated with refugee-led civil society organizations or other local or international non-state actors. The majority of these respondents were aged 18 to 35, and most were male. An interview schedule with semi-structured format was designed to systematically collect data with the possibility to have open-ended questions. During the interviews, service providers were asked descriptive questions about their institution, followed by inquiries about their main activities, services provided, number of beneficiaries, and the general profile of beneficiaries. Subsequent questions addressed past projects, their outcomes, examples of successful cooperation with other stakeholders (state and non-state), and recommendations for the development of migration support systems. This study, however, concentrates on examining how both the government and civil society organizations collaborate, the difficulties they face, and the positive aspects of their involvement.

In terms of the nature of the interviewed service providers, there were a range of both state and non-governmental organizations, both national and international

CSOs. In every city, priority was given to organizations such as the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management, the Association for Social Development and Aid Mobilization (formerly known as the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants) (ASAM), and the Turkish Red Crescent Community Centers. Additionally, interviews were conducted with other national and local NGOs, associations, and local administrations. Furthermore, in-depth interviews were carried out to capture the experiences of a local grassroots movement in the Fatih district of Istanbul, which was chosen due to its reflection of a concentration of both Syrian inhabitants and civil society actors in the district. Interviews with local NGOs engaged in refugee support were also conducted in Fatih in 2018. The interviews underwent a process where identifying information was removed to ensure anonymity. Afterwards, they were transcribed and categorized according to the types of services discussed, interactions with civil society groups, refugees, and governmental bodies. The transcribed data is subsequently analyzed based on thematic elements. This study specifically examines the dynamics of actor relationships with both non-state and state entities.

4. STATE-SUPPORTED CIVIC ASSOCIATIONISM

At the outset of the large-scale refugee movement involving Syrians, Turkey adopted open-door and camp policies while maintaining state control. Aspects such as border crossings, refugee registration, camp management, and humanitarian aid policies were overseen by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) (operated as an agency under the office Prime Ministry back then, then re-established under the Ministry of Interior after 2018), and the Turkish Red Crescent—a government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGO). These efforts were further bolstered by specific NGOs, for example the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, which was recognized for its close operational collaboration with the state in cross-border humanitarian aid endeavors (although relations frayed in subsequent political processes). Through their closely coordinated efforts, the Turkish Red Crescent emerged as one of the NGOs offering the most extensive service networks, expanding its activities in response to the onset of the refugee movement.

This state-supported civic associationism enabled the Turkish Red Crescent to secure the largest portion of EU funding, establishing a partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC, 2020). As a result of this collaboration, the Turkish Red Crescent initiated the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), a cash-based assistance program benefiting over 1.7 million refugees. By August 2020, it was recognized as “the largest humanitarian program in the history of the EU.” Through adept resource allocation, the Turkish Red Crescent has emerged as a pivotal entity, offering a range of programs and

services to refugees. These initiatives not only directly benefit refugees but also engage refugee community members who contribute through teaching, interpreting, and volunteering.

A notable flagship endeavor of the Turkish Red Crescent is the “Community-based Migration Program,” which operates 16 Community Centers across Turkey. The inaugural Community Center was established in Şanlıurfa in January 2015, catering to both local residents and displaced individuals. These centers offer an array of services including referral services, training, livelihood support, nutrition and health assistance, social activities, advocacy, and protection. They also encompass volunteer and harmonization initiatives, providing Child-Friendly Spaces and Youth-Friendly Spaces to cater to the needs of younger generations (Kızılay, 2020).

One advantage of working in close conjunction with the government, or due to an effective centralization, is the expedited delivery of services to refugees. Project proposals are also processed more swiftly due to the favorable relations that allow bypassing certain bureaucratic hurdles. An employee from one of these institutions described the cooperation in the following manner:

Due to our institution’s well-structured, long-term funds, we can develop strategic action programs. Volunteering is an integral part of our organizational framework. We maintain a close relationship with the state, yet we are not a state institution. Unlike many NGOs that lack outcome-focused outputs, we possess the capability to undertake extended projects thanks to our established structure and continuous funding stream. To illustrate, we collaborate with the migration directorate on identification and referrals. They allocate a specific day each week for our joint meetings, enabling us to advocate effectively for our beneficiaries.⁴

However, since the onset of the Syrian refugee influx in 2011, primarily in southeastern cities bordering Syria, the provision of emergency relief, establishment of camps, and rescue operations played a critical role in addressing fundamental needs like shelter, food, and healthcare access. This expansion significantly augmented the scale and capability of the third sector throughout Turkey. Notably, the United Nations’ access to the camps was constrained during this process.

According to interviews with state officials, they had anticipated the refugee movement resulting from the Arab uprisings and had prepared to accommodate newcomers within the state’s capacity and oversight. They stressed concerns about

⁴ Personal communication, GONGO employee, 22 May 2018, Istanbul.

potential security vulnerabilities from the region, which prompted the implementation of the open-door policy by state authorities.⁵

Over time, as the camps saw increasing occupancy, border crossings persisted, and refugees settled in cities, the services extended to refugees expanded. This was facilitated by the establishment of city offices or centralized structures of various NGOs in locations like Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis. Nevertheless, control over these entities was jointly managed with the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and relevant provincial administrative bodies, including the governor's office, district governorship, and police departments. To maintain close oversight, efforts were exerted to keep the operations, personnel, field activities, and financial resources of CSOs under "surveillance." This was achieved through continuous reporting, meetings conducted by the governor's office, and requests for non-state actors to share information with the authorities. These endeavors intensified following the failed coup attempt in 2016, during which the government imposed a state of emergency (lasting until 2018) and assumed control over various sectors, including non-state actors operating within the migration sphere.

Throughout the fieldwork, it was noted that there was notable activity in the operations of NGOs, particularly those that maintained close affiliations with the state and engaged in cross-border movements to fulfill humanitarian aid requirements. Being integrated into these networks facilitated the success and efficiency of obtaining permits and executing operations. NGO representatives underscored their utilization of their connections within the government or GONGOs to advance their projects.

However, these relationships with CSOs and even within various branches of the state were not always seamless, as certain government entities maintained some level of distance. When such relationships lacked robustness with the state, the outcomes often failed to yield productive results despite concerted efforts. For example,

For on-the-job training, we reached out to the Turkish Employment Agency. However, they exhibited reluctance in providing such training. They indicated that they did not outsource such services and intended to handle them internally. Regarding education, the Ministry of National Education dispatched letters to schools to ensure the enrollment of these children. Unfortunately, a few Syrian children were unable to secure spots due to the schools being at full capacity, leaving these kids without placements. As these children were unable to present documents from their home countries, the Commission would make decisions and designate schools for them, but they

⁵ Personal communication, high-level bureaucrat in office, 9 April 2018, Istanbul.

often faced challenges. Despite the Commission's decision, the school administration would respond that there were no available spots in their classrooms. The area where Syrians predominantly reside accommodates around six to seven schools. Regrettably, these schools often declined enrolling them due to capacity constraints. Syrians tend to live in close proximity to one another, residing in the same neighborhoods. Financial constraints prevent them from sending their children to schools in other districts.⁶

While these instances highlight the drawbacks of a centralized system, they also illustrate that when the centralized bureaucracy falls short in delivering prompt and efficient responses, certain situations hinge on the personal interests of key bureaucrats. When these interests are not aligned, it can lead to cooperation and coordination issues, and in some cases, result in a lack of action being taken:

We arranged a visit to my site in collaboration with the Governor's Office to establish group coordination. We reached out to the UN, expressing the necessity for a coordination meeting at our location. We communicated this to the vice governor. The UN organized a meeting in conjunction with a small project. Unfortunately, neither the governor nor the deputy governor attended, resulting in no one else attending the meeting.⁷

Based on these examples, state-led civic associationism can be understood from a dual perspective. On one hand, the state demonstrated a preference for collaborating with trusted entities to effectively implement policies. This was evident in cases where clientelist networks were well-established. For instance, individuals with prior connections were strategically appointed to key positions within civil society. These networks not only facilitated cooperation for delivering humanitarian aid and implementing policies for forced migrant groups, but also aided in identifying reliable entities. This was achieved by maintaining a flow of information from the field to the government. This introduces the second facet of state-led civic associationism, where the state sought to monitor civil society activities and foster certain relationships by leveraging existing state-civil society mechanisms. The convergence of the agendas of new actors with those of the state in the refugee context yielded progress, resulting in an increased number of non-state actors. This growth in numbers brought about capacity building and transformation, particularly in the realm of humanitarian services.

However, it is important to acknowledge that initially, the government operated under the assumption that the Syrian civil war would conclude within a short timeframe. As the civil war's duration extended, numerous national and

⁶ Personal communication, CSO professional humanitarian worker, 4 June 2018.

⁷ Ibid.

international NGOs expanded their operations and organizational networks in cities near the border. This expansion gradually encompassed other cities across Turkey. Significantly, the demand for civil society services in urban areas increased for refugees who had settled with relatives living outside of camps. Non-governmental organizations that had previously initiated activities in these areas stepped in to fulfill this need. This emergence of NGOs contributed to the proliferation of medium-sized CSOs and grassroots initiatives at the local level. This development occurred alongside the operations of international NGOs in these cities. Consequently, the government started appointing new civic workers from its close circles. Individuals who had previously been affiliated with the ruling party or had worked in other NGOs known for their close connections with the governing party were often selected.

A similar manifestation of state-led civic associationism can also be observed in the context of Syrian-led civic initiatives. This trajectory of civil society development also granted Syrians a certain level of empowerment as they established associations focusing on humanitarian concerns. For instance, the Syrian Forum supported 663 social and sports initiatives for Syrian refugees in Turkey during 2018 (Syrian Forum, 2019), and the Syrian NGO Alliance operated in Gaziantep (Syrian NGO Alliance, 2019). Interviews indicate that the initial steps toward establishing refugee-led civic entities were supported by the Presidency's office of Turkey in collaboration with the Turkish Red Crescent.⁸ This entailed the state guiding Syrian communities to initiate their associations, emphasizing the importance of capturing the perspectives of the Syrian community.

However, it can be contended that the government-led establishment of Syrian civic institutions remains relatively nascent and incomplete. Nevertheless, this formation has the potential to stimulate new collaborations and networking within the Syrian community, fostering stronger connections with local pro-refugee organizations, religious groups, as well as formal NGOs and INGOs, albeit at varying paces. Furthermore, the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in 2016 dampened the enthusiasm and interest in Syrian-led civic engagement and their activities. Support waned after the government conducted cleanup operations targeting those implicated in the coup attempt.

5. SYRIAN DIASPORA AND REFUGEE-LED INITIATIVES IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Another group that emerged within the civil society landscape is the initiatives undertaken by the Syrian diaspora. These efforts can be classified into

⁸ Personal communication, GONGO General Manager, 14 April 2018, Istanbul.

mid-sized and grassroots categories, with some evolving into more structured organizations while others struggled to establish a lasting presence.

Before 2011, the Syrian diaspora maintained pre-existing connections with Islamic nations and Western institutions, which facilitated both financial support and positive relationships for Syrian relief efforts. Given Turkey's geographical proximity to Syria, organizations engaged in aid activities preferred to operate within Turkey to facilitate the transfer of assistance into Syria. Additionally, portions of the Syrian diaspora residing in other Middle Eastern countries managed to unite in the post-2011 period. As described by a Syrian activist engaged in the humanitarian sector:

We must distinguish between two categories of Syrians: The first consists of refugees who arrived from Syria after 2011. The second pertains to Syrian refugees who fled their country in the 1970s and 1980s. It's worth noting that the ongoing conflict mirrors a similar conflict that occurred toward the latter part of the 1970s.⁹

As mentioned earlier and corroborated in the literature, the period following 2011 witnessed the emergence of ad hoc and Syrian-led legal associations, along with other CSOs dedicated to pro-refugee causes. These CSOs, whether operating through formal or informal networks, primarily focused on humanitarian aid and relief activities both within Turkey and from Turkey into Syria (Ruiz de Elvira, 2019). Case studies conducted in the field illustrate instances of professionalized humanitarian NGOs. These are CSOs established on legal grounds, characterized by financial and bureaucratic functionality, and composed of a diverse membership including both Syrian refugees and individuals from the diaspora.

One notable organization engaged in providing relief aid to Syrians, based in Hatay, not only distributed essential items such as food, blankets, and winter supplies but also embarked on post-war construction projects for housing units in Syria since 2014. As their operations expanded in scope and scale, they established new branches in other cities along the border. It is particularly worth highlighting that their cross-border activities necessitated collaboration with the state and local authorities. This entailed facilitating the transfer of goods and the state providing security to ensure the safe passage of these aid operations with the assistance of their security forces and intelligence (Delioğlu, 2019).

Conversely, in cities distant from the borders such as Izmir and Istanbul, interviews were conducted with representatives of other refugee-led associations that had been established by members of the Syrian community before the onset

⁹ Personal communication, Syrian activist and founder of a Syrian Association, 19 March 2018, Istanbul.

of the civil war. These associations took the form of small-scale and grassroots NGOs. Some of these initiatives began informally and then proceeded to formal association establishment following bureaucratic protocols, which entail obtaining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' opinion and receiving permission from the Interior Ministry.

Given that Izmir was one of the main and busiest informal crossing points to Greece, particularly during the period between 2013 and 2016, refugees sought assistance in this city. As an NGO, this association aimed to guide refugees and connect them with civil society entities in the field for further assistance. Their active involvement in the field enabled them to expand their networks and collaborations, culminating in the establishment of a Refugee Council comprising 25 other refugee-led associations. They conducted meetings with bureaucrats and other civil initiatives in Ankara.

With their projects developing and operations expanding to Istanbul and Gaziantep, this organization began receiving funds from NGOs based in Europe. This financial support aided their efforts in facilitating assistance and enhancing their presence in the aforementioned cities.

Nevertheless, there were instances of civic engagements led by refugees or local activists that did not evolve into more enduring establishments, unlike the aforementioned formalized entities. In contrast to the state and non-state actor relationships discussed earlier, which reflect centralized policies, the cases described below represent more meso- and micro-level scenarios where local authorities and grassroots initiatives intersect. However, these cases continue to underscore power asymmetries.

Three kitchen projects provide clear examples of distinct trajectories, as elaborated upon in Delioğlu's study (2019). Each of these kitchen projects originated at the local level. The first is a kitchen project located in the city of Izmit, a project led and supported by the Izmit municipality. This kitchen project operated within the framework of power asymmetries associated with local authorities. A more comprehensive analysis conducted by Delioğlu (2019) identifies the reasons as follows:

due to the power imbalance and structural hierarchy between the municipality and the project. Although the municipality proposed that the kitchen was to be owned by the women, they have opened a municipality-owned kitchen for their use. Syrian women are only able to access it when they have a specific job to complete.

The second kitchen example is from Istanbul, established by local refugee groups within the Okmeydanı district, with support from local activists engaged

in solidarity efforts. In this case, the organizational structure operated in a horizontal manner, and the initiative remained distant from any engagement with formal channels.

The third kitchen project is situated in the city of Gaziantep. This initiative was established and supported by local pro-refugees which is an NGO founded by academics, artists, and activists in Gaziantep. It has remained active within the city, securing funds from various sources including international NGOs and the EU over time. Additionally, the NGO periodically collaborates with the municipality of Gaziantep on art and culture-related endeavors. It is worth noting that Gaziantep municipality has been actively involved in offering services and partnering with CSOs on refugee-related matters (Boşnak, 2021). Consequently, the kitchen project emerged as a result of continuous solidarity and cultural production efforts fostered by the NGO, which expanded its activities over time.

All three kitchen projects shared a common foundational principle: the empowerment of women and the facilitation of their integration processes. However, despite this shared ground, each kitchen project exhibited distinct trajectories. Delioğlu underscores these differences, stating that “the strong relationships between each of these kitchens with the institutions they cooperate with, how they establish the kitchen, and how they perceive their relationship with Syrian refugee women, make the kitchens markedly distinct from one another” (2019). These cases serve as examples of how grassroots initiatives are shaped by their foundational principles and the surrounding structural context, which in turn influences their lifespan and evolution over time.

6. EXISTING CIVIC ADAPTATION TO THE NEW REALITIES OF TRANSFORMATION

Adapting and adjusting to new realities is a reciprocal process that triggers changes in both civil society actors and the state. Simultaneously, the pursuit of transformation encounters challenges posed by deeply entrenched norms and practices, such as security concerns, levels of trust in civil society, and ideological affiliations. The surge in forced migration movements after 2011 brought about various changes, including an increase in the number of actors in the field and the broadening of activity scopes as migration became prolonged.

As both the state and civil society acclimated themselves to the rise of actors within the migration arena, resulting in the development of new skills and strengthened organizational capacities, the state also formulated specific strategies to facilitate information flow and the implementation of migration policies. These strategies encompassed measures such as holding regular meetings and streamlining access to bureaucratic processes.

In the meantime, certain local non-state actor groups fulfilled the expectations of the authorities, while other entities with leftist and anti-government leanings—ideologically distant from conservatism and political Islam—chose to maintain their status as marginal or local grassroots initiatives. These entities often engaged in small-scale operations while concurrently adopting advocacy efforts. Nonetheless, in a broader sense, the civil society culture predominantly remained distant from advocacy, contentious movements, and protests. Instead, it leaned toward embracing humanitarian and integration-focused activities, particularly in the realms of education, healthcare, and service access.

In the context of refugee-led civil society initiatives, several groups expressed their gratitude for Turkey's efforts on behalf of Syrians, often citing the significance of an Arabic proverb: "A foreigner should be well-behaved."¹⁰ They displayed an open attitude towards authorities, readily shared information upon request, and actively engaged in meetings convened by entities like AFAD, the Istanbul governorate, or the PMM.

Moreover, CSOs whose primary beneficiaries consist of refugees inevitably require collaboration with state institutions such as the PMM, various ministries, local authorities, and municipalities. Notably, UN agencies maintain a close working relationship with cities, local authorities, and governmental branches, thereby safeguarding the interests of diverse stakeholders while adhering to diplomatic protocols.

Certain matters, including the refugee determination process, third-party settlement, vulnerability assessment, relocation, and readmission, necessitate decisions by state agencies. Consequently, CSOs operating in these domains navigate official state-level procedures and both formal and informal expectations due to the centralized system.

Security also ranks as a critical consideration in the activities of both the state and select local pro-refugee NGOs. Despite claims in certain reports of a restrictive operating environment for NGOs in Turkey, as posited by Gökalp Aras and Mencütek (2020),

Restrictions on NGOs range from revoking their permissions, limiting some of their services, and shutting them down. Also, the monitoring and controlling of their assistance services have increased.

An illustrative instance of state action involves the suspension of activities of certain NGOs, such as Mercy Corps, Coordination of the Organization for

¹⁰ Personal communication, Syrian activist, 19 March 2018, Istanbul.

Voluntary Service, and the International NGO Safety Organization, which saw their operating permits not renewed in 2017 (BBC, 2017). On the civil society front, it is important to highlight that there is a segment supporting such restrictions, as articulated by humanitarian workers. Certain pro-refugee humanitarian practitioners view this collaboration with state authorities as not only necessary but also beneficial due to valid security apprehensions:

These people [state] want to know what you are doing in the field, and that builds trust. Because you have to tell people. Otherwise, you become a closed box.¹¹

Hence, some non-state actors perceive the government's active supervision and control mechanism in a positive light. Nevertheless, this circumstance comes with the consequence of constraining advocacy endeavors, silencing dissenting viewpoints, and upholding a level of authority over CSOs. Consequently, this dynamic perpetuates a scenario where CSOs remain influenced by state authority. This observation reflects the broader geopolitical securitization agenda, which tends to marginalize approaches centered on human rights.

The exercise of control over civil society, the anticipation for CSOs to share information with authorities, and the process of determining which entities are authorized to operate in the field serve as exemplifications of how security-oriented policies shape the structure of the relationship between the state and civil society. As a result, activities predominantly revolve around humanitarian aid initiatives. At the same time, the state creates a certain degree of leeway and engages with organizations that align with its agenda, fostering a more cooperative approach to managing migration that corresponds with state policies and interests.

7. CONCLUSION

The so-called migration "crisis" serves as an example of a global-local crisis, where the absence of a comprehensive global solution leaves migration policies and their execution in the hands of authoritative powers. This study provides a focused examination of how the Turkish state formulated its interaction with non-state actors in response to the forced migration movement that emerged after 2011. The narrative explores the relationship between the state and civil society within the context of entrenched structural-historical contexts, security apprehensions, and the state's capacity to manage the situation, which necessitates the involvement of non-state actors. The imperative for collaboration with civil society across various realms has led to a proliferation of migration-related civil society actors, thereby fostering both transformation and heightened state security

¹¹ Personal communication, Pro-refugee Turkish NGO workers, 16 March 2018, Istanbul.

concerns. Consequently, the state's ability to oversee and regulate civil society activities, primarily through cooperation with trusted entities, is accentuated.

In summary, the Turkish state's engagement with civil society regarding the refugee issue encompasses a blend of interest-driven attributes, collaborative endeavors with select reliable entities, and the initiation of control mechanisms to monitor the broader civil society sector due to security considerations. This chapter adopts a structural perspective to illustrate these efforts, highlighting the state's direct involvement in the refugee agenda by promoting the expansion of civil society's role in addressing refugee concerns and augmenting existing non-state actors' capabilities. This approach has not only brought about transformation within civil society by enhancing expertise and fostering capacity-building but has also led to the proliferation of the migration-related civil society sector. To facilitate effective cooperation, these actors are expected to adhere to both formal and informal directives, including sharing information about their operations and personnel. The protraction of refugees' stay in Turkey prompted the state to adopt integration policies, while the international dimension of the refugee issue, particularly within the European context, facilitated financial support for civil society actors to initiate projects. Amid this transformative landscape, endeavors related to opposition and advocacy have been kept to a minimum and tightly controlled whenever possible. Large-scale operations and cross-border humanitarian assistance initiatives are directly overseen by the state and channeled through GONGOs, while mid and small-scale civil society actors have capitalized on the expansion of civil society within the confines of humanitarian aid and integration efforts.

In recent years, as mentioned, collaboration efforts regarding migration-related civil society have experienced a slowdown due to political polarization, rising anti-immigration sentiments, and the utilization of anti-migration discourse by various political parties against the government. Current data, not captured in this analysis, suggests that the relationship between the civil society and state have shifted more towards a less outspoken emphasis on migrant-driven purposes. It can be argued that the pace of collaboration has decelerated, presenting ongoing challenges and reduced support. However, further data is necessary to fully assess the current state of affairs. Future research should also delve into the dynamics of state-civil society collaboration in response to migration governance, identifying effective strategies and pitfalls. Understanding the impact of state-led policies on refugee communities and civil society's role in facilitating integration efforts is crucial. Exploring how international actors support civil society initiatives related to migration and the challenges faced by civil society organizations in advocating for migrant rights in restrictive political environments is essential. Additionally, research should systematically explain variation in state-civil society relations in Turkey, considering structural and behavioral factors determining linkages

between associations and the state. Emphasizing organizational dynamics within systemic contexts can provide valuable insights into state-civil society dynamics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adar, Sinem and Friedrich Püttmann (2022), "Making EU-Turkey cooperation on migration sustainable: a greater focus on the Turkish host society is required", SWP Comment, 7 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit).

Altıok, Birce and Salih Tosun (2020), "Understanding foreign policy strategies during migration movements: a comparative study of Iraqi and Syrian mass refugee inflows to Turkey", Turkish Studies, 21 (5): 684-704.

Atalay, Zeynep (2018), "Authoritarian neoliberalism and Islamist civil society in Turkey", Kamruzzaman, Palash (Ed.), Civil Society in the Global South (London: Routledge): 176-192.

Barın, Hilal (2021), Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin Entegrasyonunda Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Rolü (İstanbul: Kadim).

Betts, Alexander (2011), "Introduction: Global migration governance", Betts, Alexander (Ed.), Global Migration Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 1-33.

BBC (2017), "Türkiye ABD merkezli Yardım Kuruluşu Mercy Corps'un Faaliyetini Durdurdu", <https://bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39205825> (08.03.2017).

Boşnak, Büke (2021), "Politics of Subsidiarity in Refugee Reception: The Case of Civil Society in Turkey", Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 19 (3): 301-315.

Callaghy, Thomas M. (1984), The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press).

Cohen, Jean. L. (2003), "Sociedade Civil e Globalização: Repensando Categorias", Dados, 46 (3): 419-459.

Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier (1979), "Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism'?", American Political Science Review, 73 (December): 967-987.

Delioğlu, Fatmanur (2019), *Syrian Refugee Women's Solidarity Networks Through Kitchens* (Master's thesis) (İstanbul: İstanbul Şehir University).

Diez, Thomas, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber (2005), "File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction", *South European Society and Politics*, 10 (1): 1-15.

Doğan, Erhan and Genç, H. Deniz (2021), "Early-responding Civil Society and a Late Coming State: Findings from Turkey during the Pandemic", *Nonprofit Policy Forum*, 12 (1): 127-146.

Doyle, Jessica Leigh (2017), "State Control of Civil Society Organizations: The Case of Turkey", *Democratization*, 24 (2): 244-264.

European Commission (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf (16.01.2019).

Foster, Kenneth W. (2001), "Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: State Domination of Society?", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 35 (4): 84-109.

Garkisch, Michael, Jens Heidingsfelder and Markus Beckmann (2017), "Third Sector Organizations and Migration: A Systematic Literature Review on the Contribution of Third Sector Organizations in View of Flight, Migration and Refugee Crises", *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 28 (5): 1839-1880.

Gökalp Aras, N. Ela and Zeynep Şahin Mencütek (2020), "Refugee Protection: Country Report Turkey", *RESPOND Working Paper Series 3 Refugee Protection Regimes*, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-regimes-turkey-country-report> (15.12.2023).

IFRC (2020), "Turkey: Providing Cash Assistance to over 1.8 Million Refugees through EU Funding", *The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*, available online at <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/essn/> (20.01.2020).

Ikizoglu Erensu, Aslı (2016), "Notes from a refugee protest: ambivalences of resisting and desiring citizenship", *Citizenship Studies*, 20 (5): 664-677.

International Crisis Group (2018), *Turkey's Syrian refugees: Defusing metropolitan tensions*, *Europe& Central Asia Report*, 248 (Brussels).

İçduygu, Ahmet (2018), "Turkey's state policies during the mass refugee inflows: the cases of Bulgaria (1989), Iraq (1991) and Syria (2011-2013)", unpublished research report, TÜBİTAK Project no. 116K448.

İçduygu, Ahmet and Sibel Karadağ (2018), "Afghan migration through Turkey to Europe: seeking refuge, forming diaspora, and becoming citizens", Turkish Studies, 19 (3): 482-502.

Keyman, E. Fuat and Ahmet İçduygu (2003), "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses", Citizenship Studies, 7 (2): 219-234.

Koser, Khalid (2010), "Introduction: International migration and global governance", Global Governance, 16 (3): 301-315.

Kızılay (2020), "Syria Crisis Humanitarian Relief Operation", Turkish Red Crescent, Migration Services Directorate" <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/september-2020-syria-crisis-humanitarian-relief-operation-02-11-2020-20513284.pdf> (25.09.2020).

Likić-Brborić, Branka (2018), "Global migration governance, civil society and the paradoxes of sustainability", Globalizations, 15 (6): 762-778.

Mackreath, Helen and Şevin Gülfer Sağnıç (2017), "Syrian Refugees and Civil Society", Helsinki Yurттаşlar Derneđi, <http://www.hyd.org.tr/attachments/article/215/civil-society-and-syrian-refugees-in-turkey.pdf> (15.06.2022).

Matchanka, Anastasiya (2014), "Substitution of Civil Society in Belarus: Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations", The Journal of Belarusian Studies, 7 (2): 67-94.

Maxfield, Sylvia and Ben Ross Schneider (Eds.) (1997), Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Mert, Nuray (2002), "Türkiye'de Merkez Sağ Siyaseti: Merkez Sağ Politikaların Oluşumu", Yerasimoz, Stefanoz (Ed.), Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları).

Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli and Vivienne B. Shue (Eds.) (1994), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Miller, Chris, Joanna Howard, Antoaneta Mateeva, Rumen Petrov, Luis Serra and Marilyn Taylor (2009), "Toward a Typology of Civil Society: Understanding

Non-Government Public Action”, Enjolras, Bernard and Karl Henrik Sivesind (Eds.), *Civil Society in Comparative Perspective* (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing): 71-104.

Miller, Marcus J. (1997), “International Migration and Security Towards Transatlantic Convergence?” Uçarer, Emek M. and Donald J. Puchala (Eds.), *Immigration into Western Societies: Problems and Policies* (London: Pinter).

Oğuz, Mustafa Cem (2018), “Otoriter Rejimler ve Sivil Toplum ilişkisi: Bir ‘Yumuşak Güç’ Stratejisi olarak GONGO’ların Yükselişi”, *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 42 (2): 239-260.

Özçetin, Burak and Mustafa Özer (2015), “The Current Policy Environment for Civil Society in Turkey”, *Comparative Nonprofit Sector Working Paper*, 53.

Paker, Hande (2019), “Practicing Coexistence in Civil Society: Syrian Refugees in Turkey”, *Istanbul Policy Center*, 31.

Presidency of Migration Management (2024), *Statistics of Temporary Protection, Distribution of Syrians under Temporary Protection*, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (30.01.2024).

Ramos, Leonardo César Souza (2006), “Civil society in an age of globalization: A neo-Gramscian perspective”, *Journal of Civil Society*, 2 (2): 143-163.

Ruiz de Elvira, Laura (2019), “From local revolutionary action to exiled humanitarian work: activism in local social networks and communities’ formation in the Syrian post-2011 context”, *Social Movement Studies*, 18 (1): 36-55.

Sert, Deniz Şenol and Didem Danış (2021), “Framing Syrians in Turkey: State control and no crisis discourse”, *International Migration*, 59 (1): 197-214.

Shaw, Martin (1994), *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Şimşek, Sefa (2006), “The transformation of civil society in Turkey: from quantity to quality”, *Turkish Studies*, 5 (3): 46-74.

Soykan, Cavidan and Nazlı Şenses (2018), “The problem of representation: civil society organizations from Turkey in the GFMD process”, *Globalizations*, 15 (6): 824-837.

Stepan, Alfred (1978), *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Syrian Forum (2019), <http://tr.syrianforum.org/about-us.html> (21.03.2019).

Syrian NGO Alliance (2019), <http://syrianna.org/en> (21.03.2019).

TÜSEV Report (2017), “Monitoring matrix on enabling environment for civil society environment”, https://tusev.org.tr/usrfiles/images/Monitoring_Matrix_The_Civil_Society_Environment_in_Turkey_2017_Report.pdf (21.03.2019).

Weiner, Myron (1996), *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: HarperCollins).

Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2000), “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan”, *Comparative Politics*, 33 (1): 43-61.

Wilson, Fiona and James E. Post (2013), “Business models for people, planet (& profits). Exploring the phenomena of social business, a market-based approach to social value creation”, *Small Business Economics*, 40 (3): 715-737.

Yerasimos, Stefanos (2001), *Sivil Toplum, Avrupa ve Türkiye, Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları).

Zihnioğlu, Özge and Müge Dalkıran (2022), “From social capital to social cohesion: Syrian refugees in Turkey and the role of NGOs as intermediaries”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48 (11): 2455-2472.