



**THE END OF THE SUPRANATIONAL DREAM OF THE  
EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARD A MORE  
NATIONALIST AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL UNION**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN ULUS ÜSTÜ HAYALİNİN SONU:  
DAHA MİLLİYETÇİ VE HÜKÜMETLERARASI BİR  
BİRLİĞE DOĞRU**

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**ABSTRACT**

**This article questions and analyses the supranational aspirations of the European Union (EU) over its intergovernmental policies. It addresses first nationalism followed by neo-functionalism, supranationalism, and intergovernmentalism; the dominant theories in European integration. The purpose of the study is to reflect the EU's supranational limitations. Our main research question is to determine whether there is a new form of Europeanism across Europe. The study shows the rising nationalism across Europe, through the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, and the growing Euroscepticism through public opinion surveys. Moreover, a "policy analysis" is conducted through the EP resolutions between 1999 and 2024 and in European laws through Eur-lex, to reflect the number of intergovernmental operations. The overall findings indicate that many EU countries have ambiguous positions and altered views on the EU, between "Europhoria" and "Europhobia". The study suggests a new form of Europeanism is growing, between Pro-Europeanism and Anti-Europeanism: "Adapted-**

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\* Makale Geliş Tarihi / Article Received: 18.07.2024  
Makale Kabul Tarihi / Article Accepted: 05.09.2024

Europeanism". This new typology is introduced to refer to countries asking for less but more adapted integrational policies.

**Keywords:** European Union, Nationalism, Neo-Functionalism, Supranationalism, Intergovernmentalism.

## ÖZ

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) ulusüstü hedeflerini ve hükümetlerarası politikalarını sorgulamakta ve incelemektedir. Çalışmada öncelikle milliyetçilik ve kavramlarına yer verilmiş, ardından Avrupa bütünleşmesinde baskın teoriler olan neo-işlevselcilik, ulusüstücülük ve hükümetlerarasıcılık teorileri ele alınmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı AB'nin ulusüstü işleyişinin sınırlarını ortaya koymaktır. Başlıca araştırma sorumuz, Avrupa çapında yeni bir Avrupalılık biçiminin olup olmadığını tespit etmektir. Bu kapsamda, 2019 ve 2024 Avrupa Parlamentosu (AP) seçimleri aracılığıyla Avrupa çapında yükselen milliyetçilik ve kamuoyu araştırmaları ile artmakta olan Avrupa şüpheciliği gösterilmiştir. Çalışmada ayrıca, 1999-2024 yılları arasındaki Avrupa Parlamentosu kararları ve Eur-lex Avrupa yasaları araştırılarak "politika analizi" yapılmış ve AB'nin hükümetler arası karar sayısı verileri ile ulusüstü işleyişinin sınırları ortaya konmuştur. Varılan bulgular, pek çok AB ülkesinin AB ile ilgili görüşlerinin, AB sevgisi ile AB nefreti arasında karmaşık ve belirsiz olduğunu göstermektedir. Makale, Avrupa yanlısı ve Avrupa karşıtlığı arasında yeni bir Avrupalılık şeklinin gelişmekte olduğunu öne sürmekte olup, "Uyarlanmış Avrupalılık" kategorisi olarak adlandırmaktadır. Bu yeni tipoloji, daha az ama daha iyi uyarlanmış AB bütünleşme politikaları isteyen ülkeleri temsil etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, Milliyetçilik, Yeni-İşlevselcilik, Ulusüstücülük, Hükümetlerarasıcılık.

## INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is a deep and wide concept that affects the legal, political, and economic ruling environment of a country. It has been one of the most popular

regimes throughout centuries that has been the main cause of local, regional, and even global conflicts, namely the two World Wars were also mainly driven by nationalist aspirations. Nationalism continues nowadays to challenge institutions, countries, government policies, and academia. On the other hand, supranationalism is the opposite concept of nationalism. The importance and emergence of nationalism dates to the Middle Ages, while supranationalism is a rather new concept that took shape in the 1950's. Nationalism's fundamental values lie in a common identity, it glorifies and seeks the preservation of this identity and the prosperity of one's nation.

Dominant theoretical approaches to European integration are supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (Tsebelis and George, 2002: 70). Supranationalism delegates political authority from individual states to states acting as a collective body. States share sovereignty by creating a collective unit that can make binding or authoritative decisions for its members. The authority assigned to the supranational authority can vary in extent, covering more or fewer policy domains (Kahler and Lake, 2006: 7).

Intergovernmentalism is another important theoretical approach to understanding European integration. It was developed in the mid-1960s, especially with the works of Stanley Hoffmann, who stressed the convergence of national interests and the will of states to cooperate, as central to the analysis of regional integration (Verdun, 2020: 1).

Neo-functionalism is another theory of regional integration that focuses on the role of non-state actors. Member states remain important actors in the process. They set the terms of the initial agreement, but they do not exclusively determine the direction and extent of subsequent change (Schmitter, 2004: 2). The basic assumptions of the neo-functional theory and its correlation with the EU will be discussed further in the theoretical part of this paper.

The EU operates both with supranational and intergovernmental traits. While there are supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU and European Central Bank, the Council of the European Union, the European Council and the European Parliament undertake the intergovernmental power as they have the last word and the final approval power in decisions that require intergovernmental procedure.

Given this duality in the functioning models of the EU, it is worth questioning to what extent supranationalism prevails in the EU. Are nations ready to give up the sovereignty of their states, and why? What are the EU's successful projects achieved with integrationist policies? What are the limitations that the EU encountered to expand its integrationist policies? Is there a new typology among member states classed between "Europhoria" and "Europhobia"? Which

countries can be classified as such and is it the new form of Europeanism, between Pro-Europeanism and Anti-Europeanism, which can be named “Adapted-Europeanism”? These are the study's main research questions.

Within this prospect, our study is comprised of three parts. The first part presents the background of nationalism and its different forms and concepts such as nation-states, patriotism, and language. The second part comprises the theoretical framework of the dominant EU integration theories; namely, neo-functionalism, supranationalism, and intergovernmentalism, they are analyzed from the European integration perspective. The third part of the study assesses the limitations of the EU's supranationality, by evaluating EU formalities and a series of events such as the Opt-Outs, the failed EU Constitution, and Brexit. This part also exposes the analytical and the empirical framework of the research, by assessing the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament election results, the various EU public opinion surveys, and a “policy analysis” by examining the European Parliament resolutions and texts adopted in plenary sessions, in each parliamentary term from 1999 to 2024, and by examining the existing European law and regulations from the Eur-Lex database.

## **1. NATIONALISM: A DEEP AND WIDE CONCEPT**

### **Determining Nationalism**

A simple definition of a nation would be a group of people with its own territory, government, language, and culture. Nationalism can be summarized as loyalty and devotion to a nation, that considers one nation as superior to other nations. The size of the countries doesn't matter, as the nation has limitations in all cases, because the states have restricted, definite, and limited borders, where beyond other nations live (Anderson, 1991: 5-7).

Nationalism mainly relates to the principle which suggests that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983: 1). That implies that the political and national units have to be identical in order to ensure compatibility and consistency. Mainly, we can say that classic studies of nationalism have been divided between primordialists and modernists. For the primordialists, the roots are important, therefore they focus on ancient origins which explain the emanating feelings of national attachment (Smith, 2009: 17). However, for the modernists, nations are considered as modern constructs that are shaped by industrialization and capitalism on one hand and by the increase in communications and transportation networks (Gellner, 2008). Indeed, today's world mainly consists of inter-connected economic and trade activities, businesses and finance, with multi-cultural communities and societies, that are led by communication and information technologies. These advanced information technologies allow people to follow and communicate and even act beyond their territorial and national

borders. The importance of communication and interconnectivity can also be found in the EU's policies. Globalization of economy and society has intensified the limits of the nation-state's capacity (Habermas, 2003:86). These information and technological advancements brought with globalization led some scholars to question the relevance of the nation-state and to even consider that we live in a post-national, globalized world, which is dominated by new forms of cosmopolitanism (Jaffrolet, 2003: 45).

Initially, scholars argued that ethnicity was the normal result of countries' borders. However, gradually, the notion of "social constructivism" was added. The nation includes various societal forces that shape common and accepted norms and values. These values and norms are largely imprinted with a collective identity based on shared religious and/or cultural values forming and empowering the nation. Nations are continuously re-imagined (Anderson, 1983), re-invented, (Hobsbawm, 2012: 14-18) and routinely re-produced in everyday life (Billig, 1995: 1-3). This routine reproduction of nations is called 'banal nationalism'. Language, ethnicity, race, religion, culture, and history can be used to unify members of a group, but also mark boundaries against differentiated others.

### **Development and Categories of Nationalism**

After 1648, the concept of "nation-state" was spread in Europe widely with the Treaty of Westphalia." The Greek city-states were in frequent states of war for dominance (Kırilen, 2018: 19). The ancient world and the Greek city-states represent one of the most important features of nationalism of all times, which is the human nature that doesn't change. In other words, the relationship between the Greek city-states and today's world concerning nationalism lies in the fact that despite the conditions that have changed drastically with industrialization, globalization, and advances in technology and other sectors, human nature has not changed much since ancient times. It is human nature and human elements that shape the deciding part of national policies. Therefore, the relations of mankind cannot be reduced to mere economic calculations (Rollo, 1937: 130). Indeed, the ancient Greek city-states couldn't unite to form bigger and stronger nations, because of their civic pride, identity, and their loyalty to their city-states. The constant rivalry between them also prevented them from uniting. These aspects are of significant relevance to understanding our contemporary world, where there is also a constant rivalry between states, that leads to national policies.

Nationalism accepts that other nations exist, but one nation is superior to others. Nationalism dominated the European continent and expanded worldwide. When the Second World War ended, new ideas flourished in European politicians, especially with the will and collaboration of France and Germany. The

European Union started delegating power to its central authority, first in the coal and steel industries and then in other trade and economic areas.

The categorization of nationalism as an ideology is quite debated in political analysis and reflects different positions (Freedman, 1998: 748). Nationalism is an ideology that uses the concept of “nation” to reach political goals. Marx and Engels explained ideology “as conditions and ideas that lead to false consciousness in workers under capitalism” (Marx and Engels, 1973: 75-77). The idea is that the proletariat (workers) that is being exploited by the bourgeoisie doesn’t even realize this exploitation, which prevents the workers from perceiving the reality of their social class. Nationalism represents an ideology, both politically and economically. However, we will refer to nationalism as a political ideology here.

Nationalism is seen as an ideology by Adams (1993: 2), as the “simplest, the clearest and the least theoretically sophisticated, but it is also the most widespread and the one with the strongest grip on popular feeling” among modern ideologies.

Nationalism may be a “state ideology” or reflect the public opinion’s nationalism based on ethnic discourses, which may also turn into religious or ideological thought. Most of the nationalist views include some of these components.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau explained in the “Social Contract” (1968: 146) the notion of civil nationalism as the state’s legitimacy combined with people’s participation in politics. Rousseau’s Social Contract inspired many political reforms in Europe and the French Revolution as well. European people embraced the idea of rejecting the legislation of monarchs and that only the general will of the people has the right to legislate. The participation of people in politics reflects the “will of people” and most importantly provides “political representation”.

This representation gains more and more importance in European and Western states mainly, where important questions and issues have been put in referendums to ask and collect public opinion on the matter. These referendums can also be used as a tool for any nationalist government that doesn’t want to take part in further forms of integration with other countries, such as in the case of Great Britain which conducted its referendum on the EU in 2016. The same logic is also often used by many countries that don’t want to sign for example a controversial agreement for their national interests, be it in major trade agreements or any other area of international agreement. Nationalism or national interest can thus play an important role in shaping countries’ domestic and foreign policies. The examples can be added; to give other insights and results, affecting states’ policies. Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland are countries that rejected to join the EU, based on their national interests. Denmark also failed to ratify the Maastricht

Treaty in the first referendum in 1992. One of the reasons for this was the rise of nationalism and Euro-skepticism in Denmark.

Another form of nationalism is ethnic nationalism which provides states political authority over their groups based on historical, ethnic, or cultural lines whereas cultural nationalism implies that only culture forms the nation, all other aspects are disregarded. Nationalism, which is associated with national identity and statehood can sometimes lead to problematic issues related to “ethnic nationalism” linked with shared blood and common legacy/patrimony led by violent ideologies and genocides (Herzfeld, 2015: 1)

State nationalism and religious nationalism are also important forms of nationalism in states' history. The right-wing Franquism in Spain, the Belgian nationalism against Flemings, or the Basque nationalism in Spain (Tok, 2002: 170) can be given for state nationalism. Regarding religious nationalism, there are various examples such as Zionism in Israel or Hinduism in Indian nationalism (Rieffer, 2003: 225), where the state gains and executes its political and military power over religion. These forms of nationalism often end in oppressive policies and practices against minorities mostly but also against the biggest parts of society, depending on the type of situation and place.

### Concepts Surrounding Nationalism

There are various concepts developed and used alongside with nationalism. As George Orwell put it, “*Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism*” as two different and opposing ideas are involved. For Orwell, the meaning of patriotism is as the following: “*Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism is, on the other hand, inseparable from the desire for power.*” (Orwell, 1945).

Patriotism can be defined as dedication and love of one's country. It is correlated with the spirit of “us” as a common point among people towards their country against other groups (Olasupo, Olayide Oladeji, Ijeoma, 2017: 264).

Other important notions that surround the notion of nationalism are nationality, nation-state, anti-nationalism, racism, and languages.

Nationality, as defined by Karl Deutsch (1953:75), in societal and collective problems of the modern age, nationality equaled positioning of both middle and lower social groups regarding the regional centers (Deutsch, 1953: 75). "Joshua Fishman (1938: 39) defines nationality as a socio-cultural entity which may not have necessarily a politico-geographic realization, in other words, referred to as a country, polity or state. Today, nationality reflects the holder of that nation given to citizens who are born in this nation or who obtained that “nationality” by residing and working over several years in that specific country.

According to Deutsch, there are eight reasons behind the proliferation of nations and written languages, these are mass media, monetization, literacy, shift into non-agricultural occupations, urbanization, wage labor, and integral migration (Deutsch, 1969: 21). Nationalism spread across the world as the rate of literacy increased. With literacy rates rising, Indian and Irish nationalist editors discovered they were able to construct a political platform and build support for their agendas by taking their causes directly to the masses (Rosenkranz, 2013:16). In Ireland and India, nationalist feelings also guided the promotion and teaching of Celtic and Hindi.

Lastly, Hitler's Nazism is an example of racist nationalism, where another example of a current French political party is "Le Front National" (now "Rassemblement National") party led by Le Pen in France which gains its power from xenophobic and racist content.

## **2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN ACHIEVEMENT OF MULTI-FACETED GOVERNANCE**

European integration is a regional integration model that was built upon supranational aspirations derived from neo-functional theory. However, the EU is also marked and embedded with a strong intergovernmentalist model.

### **The European Union's Quest for Supranationalism**

Supranationalism is an international political and legal structure where member states share their authority and delegate their power to appointed officials or representatives elected by these member states. The majority is sufficient to make decisions, and all members must apply and enforce the decisions even if a few countries voted against them. As Nugent (2003: 475) noted, "supranationalism takes inter-state relations beyond cooperation into integration and involves some loss of national sovereignty".

A supranational union, however, also called a supranational institution, owns both regional and federal organizational traits.

The establishment of international organizations, by the 1950s helped concertation between states, but this concertation mostly depended on nation-states' good will. The EU includes both intergovernmental and supranational elements. Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism treat member states and governments differently in terms of integration processes and regarding EU's institutions (Tsebelis and Garret, 2001: 385).

Ernst Haas explained how social groups became the main actors in supporting a wider and deeper integration process in which supranational authorities were the major enabling institutions (Haas, 1958: 203). He asserted in



his book entitled “The Uniting of Europe”, that co-operation and harmony among distinct social groups enhanced and allowed a political environment that provided permanent union within competitors. He stressed in this context the importance of the union with Germany. That union was made possible with the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community. He gives the example of the French Christian-Democratic MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) that supported the European project in France. Haas also explained how other industrial groups also supported the European integration policies. For instance, Dutch steel consumers have also supported (and benefited from) the European common market. The supply has been eased and this supply access also allowed purchases in other Community countries. According to Rosamond (2005: 244), supranational institutions become the main defenders and promoters of this wider and deeper integration.

Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1948 to 1953 is among the most important politicians who supported the idea of supranationalism. In 1949, Schuman used the term “supranational associations”, and he defined supranational cooperation as “a new step in the humankind development, or even a new era in the history of the world, a century of supranationalism which followed the century of nationalisms” (Ruszkowski, 2010: 188).

Another important person in the history of European integration and supranational policy is Jean Monnet. He was appointed as the Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1919 and the first President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. As a strong supporter of supranationalism, upon Schuman’s proposal, he drafted the Schuman Plan which was made public by the famous speech of Robert Schuman in May 1950, known as the Schuman Plan. Monnet devoted the rest of his life to the work of European unification, and he expressed his belief and vision of a successful Europe by saying “Continue, continue, there is no future for the people of Europe other than in union” (European Union: Jean Monnet)

With the European Community (EC), cooperation began in the new geopolitical core of Europe, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Iron and Steel Community became later the European Economic Community (EEC).

The EC was mostly in line with the nation-state, until the 1980s. However, through the 1980s, the EC began limiting the sovereignty of its member states by adopting new political regulations (Mann, 1993:121). For the large internal market may function efficiently, either common policies (agriculture, fisheries..) or

Community support policies (taxation, competition..) and, therefore, further surrenders of national sovereignty were necessary (Moussis, 2001: 56).

The supranational organizations offer some benefits to their member states by setting trade-related standards that help to maintain economic stability in all member states. In supranational organizations, political and economic standards are respected by member states. However, the nature of the supranational organization can be changed, thus the union can adopt new political and economic conditions (Zaharia and Pozneacova, 2020: 48).

There are according to Mann (1993), there are three main under-cuttings of national sovereignties:

- 1) EC Law: National laws are revised in order apply the communitarian law: standardization is required for all EU countries.
- 2) The Single Market: The 1986 Single European Act removed the internal boundaries.
- 3) The European Monetary System (EMS): The use of a single currency, the Euro, which also affected the macroeconomic planning of states.

Member states' sovereignty has been limited by these activities. We can also add the European Constitution to this list and the European march toward supranationalism. While some countries chose to pass the draft Constitution through their own parliaments, Spain and Luxembourg chose to hold referendums, and some other countries contested and rejected the European Constitution via referendums, namely the Netherlands and France in 2005. The Constitution needed to be accepted by each member, this is why the draft Constitution has been revised and its name was changed because the word "Constitution" was the main reason for the rejections. Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon was finally signed in 2007 replacing the draft Constitutional Treaty and became effective from 1<sup>st</sup> December 2009.

Sweet and Sandholtz (1997: 297-300) explained the transition from national to intergovernmental or supranational governance in two steps. The formation of the social demand based on European transactions necessitated the EU to prepare new regulations that would be provided by the supranational nature of the organization. Once the regulations are prepared, a new step follows which is the institutionalization process that generates further integration.

At the beginning of the 1950s when initial European theoreticians were active in shaping European integration, some politicians and scholars expected and hoped that economic integration would bring a full political integration level. Almost 75 years have passed since the formation of the European Coal and Steel

Community, and we cannot talk yet of a full political entity at the EU level. However, it is undeniable that the EU policies and integration projects developed a certain European identity. However, this identity has not been able to replace national identities. Still, it is true that for many Europeans and the EU, a shared and significant “European identity” is formed and added to national identity (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012: 106).

### **The European Union’s Evolution in Intergovernmentalism**

In intergovernmentalism, member states maintain their full sovereignty and authority and make decisions by unanimity. The heads of these international organizations either appointed or elected, only have advisory tasks. Many international organizations prefer and use intergovernmentalism nowadays. In the mid-1960s, intergovernmentalism was the main theoretical alternative to neo-functionalism, which was the dominant theory of regional integration (Hoffmann, 1966: 862).

Stanley Hoffmann (1966, 1982) formulated the major assumptions of intergovernmentalist integration theory, and he also introduced “high politics” and “low politics” differences to assert the limits of integration and spillover. “High politics” refers to matters and policies regarding national sovereignty such as domestic affairs, justice, foreign policy, defense, and security, where it is hard to identify a common interest and common policy. “Low politics” area refers to other policies mostly however, taxation, energy, economic, and monetary policies can also be considered as crucial areas of national sovereignty as well (Hoffmann, 1966).

Thus, classic intergovernmentalism differs from supranationalism in many ways; first, it sees states and their national governments as the primary actors in international relations, instead of any high or central authority. Second, national interests determine the level of integration that states can accept. Third, integration is allowed only in the economic sector and refers to ‘low politics’ because states want to preserve and keep their autonomy. Therefore, states will resist the integration of the core functions of the sovereign state, called high politics’ such as domestic and external security or foreign policy (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2022: 63-64).

Later in the 1980s and 90s, Andrew Moravcsik’s works introduced liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 1998) where he tried to explain European integration through this theory. Moravcsik differs liberal intergovernmentalism from the classic intergovernmentalism by emphasizing domestic rather than national interests. At the domestic level, which is the first stage, different trade or interest groups in the country would be competing with each other to influence

the national decision and obtain priority within the integration policies. Then the second stage would be comprised of negotiations between states.

Therefore, we can say in a way that “liberal intergovernmentalism” is similar to realism in the fact that it puts states, state interests, and state bargaining at the first stage of importance. However, liberal intergovernmentalism also gives societal actors and international institutions a more prominent theoretical role. Therefore, Keohane and Nye (1977) asserted that liberal intergovernmentalism is based on “neo-liberal institutionalism”.

Moravcsik argues that at the first level, European states are lobbied by domestic pressure groups such as companies, and NGOs, to adopt policies at the international level. The governments, after deciding and adopting appropriate policies, put their national policy preferences at the international level.

At this second stage, state-to-state bargaining starts. Moravcsik defines states as unitary, which means that despite numerous interest groups at the domestic level, the state acts as a single actor at the international level and speaks with one voice in support of its national position. Besides, Moravcsik also defines states as “rational actors”, which means that states make decisions on a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, at the international level states make decisions with other EU states by assessing their costs and benefits on a given issue. Thus, the decision-making process is based on the unitary character of states at the state bargaining and on the rationality of states where their ultimate objective is to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. During the bargaining stage between European states, the outcome would depend on the relative power of the states. The second basic argument is that states are purposive actors (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2019: 1-3).

The meaning of this sentence is related to the “rationality of the state” in their decisions. As Glaser (2010: 30) also stated: “acting rationally means that states are purposive actors that make at least reasonable efforts to choose the strategy that is best suited to achieving their goals. States are assumed to be able to identify and compare options, evaluating the prospects that they will succeed, as well as their costs and benefits.” The commitment to the rational actor model of state behavior is said to be a core assumption of realist theory (Schmidt and Wight, 2023: 158). This argument is also stressed by Moravcsik) in his liberal intergovernmental theory of integration, when he defines states as purposive actors referring to the unitary and rationality of states during the decisions taken by the EU member states. Thus, this explanation is especially important to understand as it is of direct relevance to our research topic in which we are assessing the nature and reasons behind the European integration. The term “Purposive actors” which is used to define the states in their research of maximizing their interests is also the logic that

is mostly used behind nationalist political groups and policies. In this sense, a growing number of EU states also want to put their national interests above European interests. The increase in the far-right policies reflects this “purposive” and “conscious” choice from their voters who don’t want to put their national sovereignty at risk or below the EU’s supranational authority for the sake of European integration.

According to Schimmelfennig (2015), liberal intergovernmentalism can be spotted in the European policies during the Euro area crisis. The European countries had different national preferences, and they argued and bargained with the European Commission to choose the right decisions for the protection of the Euro (Schimmelfennig, 2015: 177-180)

### **Neo-functionalism and the European Integration**

Neo-functionalism theory is formed and developed from David Mitrany’s studies, in which he is considered to be the creator of the theory of functionalism. Mitrany explained the concepts of “interdependence”, “function” and “need”, in his theory of functionalism. According to Mitrany, needs would determine the functions that would be fulfilled by international organizations, and needs would be determined and shaped by the developing technology. To give an example, the invention of airplane and the development of aviation revealed and determined the necessity of coordination in the aviation transportation. This coordination would become the “function” fulfilled by an international organization (Mitrany, 1966: 26-27).


Based on Mitrany’s works on the theory of functionalism, neo-functionalism was developed later especially by Ernst B. Haas. The basic research area of Haas was how to reach a “larger political community” through peaceful means. His answer to this question lied in the existence of different interest groups in national societies and the research of these groups for relation and collaboration with other national groups, sharing the same interests. Haas explained the European integration, especially based on the concept of “spill-over” effect, where collaboration starts in one or more sectors and then expands to other sectors, allowing to the gradual integration in more sectors. Haas built the idea of spillover on changes in the attitudes and behavior of governments, parties, and, especially, labor and business interest groups, where his key conclusion was that “group pressure will spill over into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse” (Haas, 1958:13).

Ernst Haas conceives political integration as a process “*whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction*”

over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the preexisting ones” (Haas, 1958:16).

The theory of Neo-functionalism is essential to explain and illustrate the functioning of the EU and EU integration studies. Jean Monnet, known as the architect of Europe, has indeed put the principles of neo-functionalism into application quite before Haas’s theory.

**Figure.1: Two Means of Eroding Sovereignty (Jones, 1996)**



This chart illustrates the two ways in which states lose their sovereignty: The first chart on the left reflects the transfer of various functions to a supranational authority in which national sovereignty is thus eroded and the second chart on the right reflects how states are bound to accept agreements that are based on majority decisions.

Kuhn (2019) explains very well how public opinion doesn’t matter for officials in the neo-functional theory. She explains that based on writings, ordinary people have no impact on the European integration process.

According to Niemann and Ioannou (2015: 196-200), neo-functionalism and spill-over effects helped the EU to reach the European Monetary Union and coped with the different views regarding the Euro and thus helped to apply more integrative policies across the member states who opted to strengthen the EU common interests and markets. Neo-functionalism reflects the integrative solutions that were taken in economic and financial crises.

According to Risse (2005: 299), the “Hass’s expansive logic of sector integration” and its “spill-over” effects explain very well why more and more policy sectors have been included in the European integration process. “To that extent, there is no need to discard neo-functionalism”. Yet, the power of EU supranational institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice did not constantly increase in parallel to sector

integration at the expense of intergovernmental institutions such as the European Council and the Council of Ministers.

Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) used Haas's neo-functional theory to explain the creation of the supranational area in European space that was bound by the institutionalization of legal rules and practices. They have put forward the supranational policy implication between EU institutions and national interest groups. They argued that neofunctionalism spilled over the area of "high politics".

Börzel edited in 2006 "The Disparity of European Integration: Revisiting Neofunctionalism in Honour of Ernst B. Haas", where she contributed to the research on European integration. She starts by explaining how the Treaty of Rome set the constitutional framework for a Common Market, and that the "acquis communautaire" represents a unique degree of political integration beyond the nation-state, crowned later with the common currency. Börzel questions why member states have been willing to compromise their sovereignty in some areas, such as with the common currency and EU citizen rights and have resisted any substantial cuts in other areas; such as security and defense, social welfare, culture, and education. She quotes Haas in his explanation of "task expansion" at the heart of the neo-functional approach with the consequent expansive logic of sectoral integration in the cornerstone of Haas's theory of regional integration (Börzel, 2006: 2)

McGowan (2007) also analyzed Haas's neo-functional theory and its suitability on the European competition policy. His research asserted that Haas's interpretation still holds analytical purchase as a mid-range theory that is applicable to the dynamics and development internal market, single currency, trade policy, fisheries policy and the competition policy where decisions are mostly made beyond the control of the member states. It is an area where the Commission, the European Courts and business associations are the key actors in determining policy direction (McGowan, 2007: 13).

Bora and Schramm (2024: 1) also researched the EU competition policy and indicated that it is one of the few truly integrated policy fields of the EU, with supranational actors like the European Commission having extensive competencies. Scholars consider it to be a relatively stable policy domain, with a solid European primary law.

Neo-functional structure suggests that the EU would reach an equilibrium, while liberal intergovernmentalism claims that there is already an equilibrium (Hodson and Puetter, 2019: 1160).

### 3. THE LIMITS OF THE EU'S SUPRANATIONALITY: ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

This part is comprised of formal limitations of the EU institutional structure that allow opponents of supranationalism to stay apart from further integration such as the Opt-Outs and the events that have precipitated and increased Eurosceptic views such as the EU Constitution and Brexit. This part also covers the analytical and empirical framework of our study, including EU public opinion surveys from Pew Research Center, Statista, and Eurobarometer, which reflect the national tendencies across the EU, the European Parliament election results that reflect an increase in far-right and national votes, providing the empirical data from the European population and countries.

Additionally, the author also conducted an in-depth “policy analysis” to expose the balance of power and the institutional and political indicators compiled from the European Parliament resolutions adopted between 1999 and 2024 and compiled from the European regulations and law inventory Eur-Lex, by searching the words “supranational”, “intergovernmental”, “nationalism” and “national sovereignty”. This research complements the empirical and analytical framework of our study.

#### **European Opt-Outs, Failure of the EU Constitution and Brexit**

The limits of the EU supranationality are reflected through the opt-outs which are applied by some countries that don't want to join that level of integration on various policies (Cramer and Franke, ECFR, 2021). These opt-outs allow the EU to avoid a general breakdown and move on with its projects. Some examples of opt-outs are (Eurlex):

- Schengen Agreement: Ireland; Great Britain
- Economic and Monetary Union (Euro): Denmark;
- The Common Security and Defense Policy: Denmark;
- EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Poland;
- Freedom, Security and Justice: Denmark and Ireland
- The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): Malta

Great Britain was an EU member from 1973 until 2020 but was often called “an awkward member” because of its reluctance to join many policies and strategies that aimed for further and deeper integration at the EU level. British governments mostly had Euro-skepticism which finally turned into a political campaign and resulted in the British Referendum on the EU in 2016. This process



known as “Brexit” took an irreversible path and resulted in the withdrawal, on 31 January 2020, ending thus 47 years of membership.

Hooghe and Marks (2019: 1123). explained well how the Brexit referendum reflected the anxiety between integrative pressures and national opposition. Malang and Schraff have analyzed the opt-out issue and have concluded that the member states’ divergences push them to opt for less integration also in the long-term, it becomes their future vision. In other words, the more countries use opt-outs, the more they ask for new opt-outs in the future (Malang, 2023: 1). This situation is also described as the “differentiated integration” between the EU countries. We can talk about “Differentiated Policy Implementation” when there are divergences in the application of the EU laws across the member states (Zhelyazkova et al., 2023: 445).

Differentiated integration is in fact one of the most significant realities of the EU. “Differentiation” is accepted as an important characteristic element of European integration and over half of EU policies are executed in different ways (Leruth and Lord, 2015: 754). Indeed, differentiation integration is widely accepted and known as the central aspect of the current EU functioning, it is also called “Europe a la carte”, “variable geometry Europe”, “double-gear Europe” or “multi-gear Europe”. Nugent (2010) indicated that while some countries like Belgium and Italy have optimistic and federal views on economic and political union, countries like England, Denmark, and Sweden are sensitive about sovereignty and cautious about integration. This is why the EU has included the concept of integration at different levels and speeds, along with the concept of flexibility, in the acquis with the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties (Nugent, 2010: 448-450).

The draft EU Constitution also marked the limit of supranationalist policy as there have been important oppositions and concerns across the EU. With the rejections at the French and Dutch referendum, the process was ended, and the EU had to revise some of its constituent supranational elements to relieve public and political opinion, which established later the Lisbon Treaty of 2009.

The difficulty in reaching a consensus on foreign policy and defense issues marks the complicated issue of the European integration policies. There is no consensus among its members concerning these points.

According to Mann, Europe stands away from supranationalism, for many reasons. First, for most economic policies the European Commission is in charge, leading and guiding the member states with exclusive power, but the approval of each member state is needed on the conclusion and signing of big trade agreements with third countries. Thus, we can talk about shared sovereignty. Second, in other civilian policy areas, sovereignty remains largely in nation-states. Third, in defense

and foreign policy, very little sovereignty is located anywhere. The EU is diplomatically recognized by many states and is an accredited observer of the UN, but so is the Vatican (Mann, 1993: 127).

In delicate issues that have the risk of bringing opposition, the EU avoids supranational measures and provides instead opt-out options to serve geo-political interests and bloc any tension that would harm the EU. The British Government declared for example its opposition to the monetary union, and the EU accepted this opt-out, to avoid deadlock. Therefore, EU provides a “European” regulation only for areas agreed on by traditional geo-politics. In other words, it doesn’t take states’ power. The European federalist policy was marked by resistance from Nation-States. However, some federal aspects can still be seen in the EU like the share of competencies between the Community and the States, the interaction of politics, the role and jurisprudence of the Justice of the Court, the communitarian juridical decisions, the political and constitutional incidences of communitarian treaties in the internal order of states (Goutron, 1997: 12).


Risse explains very well the balance between the European Commission and the Council, by giving the example of the increased Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) areas of the Commission did not make the Commission a sort of “European Government”. “From Maastricht via Amsterdam and Nice, all the way to the Constitutional Treaty, the balance of power between particularly the Council and the Commission has reached a rather stable equilibrium, even though the ‘expansive logic of sector integration’ and communitarization continued to run its course” (Risse, 2005: 10).

### **Analytical and Empirical Framework: Surveys on the EU Public Opinions, EP Elections and Policy Analysis**

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty established the European Union and provided the EU a deeper integration and authority, as it introduced the way toward the euro and created EU citizenship (European Council). Some EU countries have historically favored the intergovernmental approach, while others favored the supranational path. Supranationalists claim that integration can be reached faster because in intergovernmentalism states’ decisions take several months or sometimes even years. Examples of these supporters are traditionally Belgium and Germany. For intergovernmentalists however, only national governments should possess democratic legitimacy and claim that supranationalism puts national sovereignty in danger. Supporters of this position included Britain and Denmark and also France and Estonia on some issues. Today, there are changes in support for a deeper integration across the EU in general. As new national and international issues are added, there are more concerns over these issues which are mostly reflected in the rise of nationalist parties against EU political integration


(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2024: 4). The rise of nationalism in Europe can be seen in recent years, in the national elections of the EU countries too. For example, Van der Bellen won in May 2016 the presidential election in Austria, however, he was very close to losing against Hofer, the far-right candidate. Their respective votes were 50.3% to 49.7%. Besides, Austria is not the only country with nationalism on the rise, many other European countries witnessed an increase in nationalist parties and policies in 2016. The figure below exposes the rise of nationalism across Europe in recent years (McCarthy, 2016).

**Figure.2: The Rise of Nationalism Across Europe (Statista, 2016)**



Unsurprisingly, the 2019 European Parliament election results were marked by a significant increase in the vote for far-right parties, especially in Italy and France, where the “League” and “National Rally” were the leading national parties. Their allies in the Flemish Interest Party also made gains in Belgium. Other strong far-right parties represented in the EP were the Austrian and Dutch Freedom Parties, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Danish People’s Party, and the Finns Party (House of Commons, 2019).


**Figure.3: Views on the European Union (Pew Research Center, 2019 European Union Survey)**



Pew Research Center’s survey in 2019 reflected significant rates of Eurosceptic opinion, equaling or surpassing 25%, even in the 11 pro-European countries, from the 14 countries questioned in total.

Additionally, in the survey published by Statista in August 2024, 28 % of respondents stated in 2023 that their country would be better outside of the EU. As can be seen from Figure 4 below, the countries with the greatest share of Eurosceptic views included Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Austria, Czechia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, and France. These countries tend to have strong contingents who disagree with the EU on cultural issues, notably far-right parties in Poland (PiS) and Italy (Brothers of Italy/Lega).

**Figure.4: Share of Respondents agreeing or disagreeing that Their Country Could Face the Future Better Outside of the European Union in 2023 (Statista, 2024)**



These surveys indicate an important share of Eurosceptic or anti-European views by countries. Besides, even in pro-European countries, there is a significant concern about certain EU policies. For example, the majority of Bulgarians (60%) like the European Union and do not question the country’s EU path, but there is an increasing skepticism about certain EU policies and EU’s management, based on a survey conducted by Alpha Research sociological agency published in March 2024. Only 12% stated that they fully approve how the EU is managed, 42% see good policies but also problems, and 39% are dissatisfied (Nikolov, 2024).

France is also on this track, where there is a growing suspicion toward Europe. According to Bréchon (2024), the French no longer trust the Union, the French identify as Europeans and yet are also notoriously Eurosceptic. According to the 2023 Eurobarometer, only 34% had confidence in the EU and 48% said they were very pessimistic about the future of the Union, which was the highest percentage of the 27-country bloc.

### European Policy Analysis: European Parliament Resolutions and Eur-Lex Data Base

This part of our analytical framework is based on the research and analysis of the resolutions and texts voted and adopted in the European Parliament plenary sessions. Within this part, the number of texts including the terms “Supranational”, “Intergovernmental” and “European nationalism”, were researched, in the last 5 parliamentary terms, from 1999 to 2024.

This methodological research is of special relevance to our study as it reflects the sensitivity, discussion areas, policy orientations, the reports and resolutions coming from the Parliament committees that are voted in the EP plenary sessions, and the final texts that are adopted, published, and transmitted later to the relevant authorities. The table below comprises the number of texts including the terms “supranational”, “intergovernmental”, “European nationalism” and “national sovereignty”, in the last five Parliamentary terms, from 1999 to 2024.

**Table.1: Policy Analysis Based on the EP Plenary Sessions (Compiled by the author from EP Plenary Sessions)**

Parliamentary Term→	2019-2024	2014-2019	2009-2014	2004-2009	1999-2004
Number of Texts including the term “Supranational”	13	10	20	12	12
Number of Texts including the term “Intergovernmental”	170	127	107	96	74
Number of Texts including the term “European nationalism”	40	47	58	57	21
Number of Texts including the term National Sovereignty	12	13	4	8	4

As can be seen from Table 1, the word “supranational” was used in an average 12 documents. The mostly discussed topics were:

- The state of the debate on the Future of Europe
- Current institutional set-up of the European Union
- Banking Union
- New Energy Market Design
- International Telecommunication regulations
- Climate change

More importantly, the word “intergovernmental” was used in 74 documents between 1999 – 2004, and increased in each parliamentary term, passing from 74 to 96 between 2004 and 2009, then to 107 from 2009 to 2014, and later to 127 between 2014 and 2019, and finally to 170 documents between 2019 and 2024. This constant increase of the term “intergovernmental” in the texts adopted by the EP reflects the high importance of intergovernmental functioning, policy, and processes, over the supranational functioning of the EU. These documents largely focused on topics including:

- Energy
- Migration and refugees
- Differentiated integration
- institutional set-up of the EU
- Environment and security
- Cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries
- Global climate crisis
- EU funds
- Sustainable carbon cycles
- EU Emissions Trading System

**Table.2: Eur-Lex: The Terms Used by Year of Documents (Compiled by the author from the Eur-Lex database)**

<b>Number of Documents in→</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2020</b>
<b>Term searched↓</b>					
Supranational	40	65	76	121	86
Intergovernmental	256	506	461	452	336
National sovereignty	13	20	17	24	23

As can be seen from Table 2, the number of documents including the term intergovernmental exceeds largely the number of documents including the term supranational and an increase can be observed in recent years.

**Table.3: Eur-Lex: The Terms Used By Type of Act (Compiled by the author from the Eur-Lex database)**

Type of Act → Term ↓	EU Law and Case- law	Legal Acts	Consolidated Text	Provisional Data
<b>Supranational</b>	1458	153	164	147112
<b>Intergovernmental</b>	10252	1170	1099	842
<b>National sovereignty</b>	848	45	8	82

Again, the number of EU laws and legal acts comprising the term “intergovernmental” outpaces the ones with “supranational” content. This data reflect the huge amount of acts and laws operated intergovernmentally in the EU.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This paper explored the theoretical framework of European integration, neo-functionalism, supranationalism, and intergovernmentalism. Each of them contributed to EU’s integration and successful projects and policies have been put in place. While the EU’s structure has been constructed upon supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank, both the European Council and the European Parliament can act as the most important actors reflecting intergovernmental and member states’ authority. When we look at the economic level, “core” and “periphery” regions, the difficulty of completing the monetary union, illustrates the existence of different speeds in the EU. Besides, despite supranational functioning in many areas, some delicate issues such as the common foreign and security policy remain an area of intergovernmental collaboration.

The study revealed the rising nationalism across Europe, especially in the last decade and the growing Euroscepticism through both national elections and the 2019 and 2024 European elections. Additionally, Pew Research Center (PRC), Statista, and Eurobarometer surveys are of significant relevance to our research question of whether there is a new form of Europeanism across the EU. These surveys not only reflect the support rates of the EU population toward the EU, but they also reveal an important share of unfavorable opinion even among the EU-supporting countries. This is particularly reflected in the 2019 PRC survey where France, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Hungary and Germany’s unfavorable opinion toward the EU are roughly between 30 and 47%.

Besides, in light of the latest data (Statista, 2024), countries with the greatest share of Eurosceptic views included Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Austria, Czechia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, and France. Therefore, we consider these countries as countries that fit into the new typology of “Adapted

Europeanism”. Our main hypothesis is that even in pro-European countries, there is a growing concern about certain EU policies. The “Adapted-Europeanism” claims that these countries demand less but “more adapted” policies to their national sensitivities and national preferences.

Moreover, the “policy analysis” research conducted through the analysis of the resolutions and texts voted and adopted in the European Parliament plenary sessions revealed that the term “intergovernmental” was used in 170 documents in the latest parliamentary term (2019-2024) and 115 documents in average in the last 5 Parliamentary terms, from 1999 to 2024, while the term “supranational” was used in 13 documents in the latest Parliamentary term and 13,5 documents in average between 1999 and 2024. This quantitative data illustrates indeed the EP’s and member states’ sensitivities and policy orientations, toward intergovernmentalist system.

Similarly, the policy analysis conducted through EU law and legal texts also provides compatible results. The number of documents including the term intergovernmental exceeds largely (seven times) the number of documents including the term supranational and an increase has been observed in recent years. This data reflects the huge amount of acts and laws operated intergovernmentally in the EU.

Therefore, it is undeniable that the EU’s supranationalism will not eliminate nation-states. EU’s supranational capacity is indeed limited because national sovereignty continues to be among the primary objectives of countries, especially in delicate topics such as common foreign and security policy in the EU. Moreover, the general increase in the far-right votes in Europe in recent years and also in the 2024 European Parliament election also indicate that EU integrationist policies and supranational aspirations will largely stay limited; the EU will mostly stand as an intergovernmental union that tends to collaborate on selected issues. There is no doubt that the populist parties that claim less powerful EU and stronger national authorities would prepare more rigid regulations to limit migration quotas. Many EU countries stand today in this new typology of “Adapted Europeanism”: adapted to their national preferences, to their national aspirations, to their national values, and to their national interests.

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