



THE OTHERS OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT
PARTY (JDP): A GENDER-BASED APPROACH TO *HUM*
DEBATE IN MODERN TURKEY

ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ'NİN (AKP) ÖTEKİLERİ:
MODERN TÜRKİYE'DE *HUM* TARTIŞMASINA
TOPLUMSAL CİNSİYET TEMELLİ BİR YAKLAŞIM

Can ÖZELGÜN*

ABSTRACT

This article explores the evolving meanings and political uses of the Qur'anic pronoun *hum*, a locally rooted tool of exclusion and legitimation in Turkey's political history. Tracing its genealogy from the 1876 *Kanun-u Esasi* debates to the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) gender regime (2011–2021), it argues that *hum* historically marked the line between those deemed politically legitimate and those excluded. While its referents have shifted—from non-Muslims in the late Ottoman era to feminists, LGBTQI+ individuals, atheists, etc. in contemporary Turkey—it remains an elastic boundary of otherization. Adopting a *longue durée* perspective, the article links the JDP's discourse to its center-right predecessors, demonstrating a paternalist-populist fusion shapes gender politics. In this context, *hum* sustains a binary between “pure” and “corrupt” women. The study thus contributes to debates on gendered legitimacy and illustrates how exclusionary scripts are redefined under authoritarian configurations.

Keywords: Gender, Other, JDP, Legitimacy, Constitution.

* Ph.D. Candidate, Yeditepe Univ., Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye, can.ozelgun@std.yeditepe.edu.tr, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5440-7074>

* Makale Geliş Tarihi / Article Received: 07.05.2025
Makale Kabul Tarihi / Article Accepted: 01.08.2025

ÖZ

Makalede, Kur'an'daki zamir *hum*'un Türkiye'nin siyasi tarihinde dışlama ve meşrulaştırma aracı olarak değişen anlamlarını incelemektedir. 1876 Kanun-u Esasi tartışmalarından Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) 2011–2021 dönemi cinsiyet rejimine uzanan süreçte *hum*, kimin siyasi olarak meşru kabul edileceğini belirleyen bir sınır olarak kullanılmıştır. Osmanlı'da gayrimüslimlerden, günümüz Türkiye'sinde feministler, LGBTQI+ bireyler, ateistler gibi çeşitli gruplara yönelen bu dışlayıcı söylem, esnek bir dışlama çizgisidir. *Longue durée* yaklaşımını benimseyen çalışma, AKP'nin söylemini merkez sağ öncülleriyle ilişkilendirerek ataerkil-popülist bir ideolojinin cinsiyet politikalarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. *Hum* bu bağlamda, “saf” ve “yozlaşmış” kadın ayrımını sürdürerek siyasette meşruiyet sınırlarının toplumsal cinsiyet üzerinden nasıl çizildiğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Öteki, AKP, Meşruiyet, Anayasa.

INTRODUCTION

A case could be made that the JDP era holds a special place in the debates about the “old” and “new” Turkey¹. In this respect, it is arguable that the JDP epoch is a milestone. These debates are based on how different the two Turkeys are². However, this article aims to demonstrate historical continuity, not difference, through the concept of *hum*. Starting from the KE debates and extending to the center-right precursors of the JDP in the 20th century, namely the Democrat Party (DP) and the Justice Party (JP), and the JDP itself, *hum* molded the socio-political disputes regarding the legitimacy. *Hum* is a gender pronoun in the Qur'an and can be translated as “them”, and Surah Ali 'Imran, *veşâvir hüm fil'emr*, is the verse in the Qur'an that instructs authorities to seek *hum*'s advice before passing judgement or taking action (The Qur'an, 3:159). In the discussions before the First Constitutional Era (FCE) in the Ottoman Empire, there was no consensus on whether *hum* comprised all the population or simply those who were

¹ On this subject, see: Bora, 2016; Bora, 2018; Aygün, 2014; Christofis, 2018.

² See Çalışkan and Waldman, 2017 and Çağaptay, 2020. On the other hand, also see the 56th issue of the *Yeni Türkiye* magazine, a special issue on the new Turkey, which covers the “new” Turkey from every angle, from economy to politics, and includes an article by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan titled “New Turkey” (*Yeni Türkiye Dergisi*, Ocak-Şubat 2014).

qualified and worthy (Tekin, 2000). Given *hum*'s contested content, it has been an elastic exclusion line since the Ottoman Empire.

The article examines *hum*'s role in exclusion and marginalization from the KE to the JDP era (2011-21). Here, the article will concentrate on the tools through which *hum* defined social belonging and the boundaries of exclusion, repeatedly forging an "other" in the historical process. Consequently, it enabled the alienation of others while simultaneously cultivating a sense of belonging for some. The otherization role it played in the debates on KE continued in the othering and exclusion of feminists and LGBTQI+ individuals in modern Turkey. The latter, in turn, points to the "path dependency" aspect of the concept. Herein, *hum* functioned as a "path dependency" that legitimized political decisions in the discourse of the DP, the JP, and the JDP.

This "path dependency" took shape in the KE debates as a first layer and resurfaced in the Republican period as a second. In the first one, the debate was about whether *hum* would include non-Muslims from different Abrahamic religions outside the "dominant nation" (Depenheuer, 2006: 50; Tekin, 2000: 152). However, in the second "layer", gendered through its interaction with the concept of gender, *hum* became a tool for reinforcing gender inequality. While the subject of non-*hum* transformed within historical continuity—no longer referring exclusively to non-Muslims but now encompassing groups such as the LGBTQI+ community, atheists, politically active Kurds, and practicing Alawites—it consistently corresponded to the "other"/"they" who are "not worth consulting" within the dimension of legitimacy, keeping debates around this verse persistently relevant.

In our case, it is worth emphasizing that women should also be included in the JDP's long list of non-*hums*. This exclusionary stance does not appear to be entirely ideologically neutral. One might argue that *hum* served as a result of the combination of paternalism and populism. Evoking Mudde (Mudde, 2004: 543; Mudde, 2007: 151), in 2011-2021, one might claim that R. T. Erdoğan's monist ideology assumed that women were eventually divided into two identical and hostile groups, the "pure" women and the "corrupt" feminist elite, and that women's policies had better represent people's general will. However, since Erdoğan's populism was a thin-centered ideology, it needed a thick ideology like paternalism. In that sense, echoing Sunstein and O'Connell (Sunstein, 2014: 57, 60; O'Connell, 2020: 120), he is apt to paternalism by the agency of the conflict between his acceptance that "the people" have a distinct and monolithic will and the truth that likings and inclinations on policies change substantially within the citizenry portrayed as "the Turkish people". Correspondingly, Erdoğan strived to suppress this plurality with his gender justice policies. At this juncture, *hum*, can help identify the gender components of the JDP's paternalistic populism by

facilitating historical critical reconstruction. Echoing Gaus (Gaus, 2013: 553), this article's historical critical reconstruction serves as a "social critique" of the historical process, portraying the humane and practical principles upon which criticism of political situations might be instituted.

The concept of identity in Turkey has been discussed by many political scientists with notions like multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism imported from the West. While concepts like these are meaningful in situating Turkey globally, they present a limited approach. This article aims to contribute to the literature by offering an insider's perspective on the JDP's gender regime through the concept of *hum*, hence infusing a local and intersectional angle of vision into the literature.

The structure of the article is as follows. It will begin with the methodology section, outlining the methodological framework, the temporal scope, and the type of research conducted. This will be followed by the literature review, focusing on two main bodies of work: studies on the JDP's gender regime and discussions surrounding the concept of otherization. Given that this article presents a gender-based analysis, engaging with both strands of literature is essential. However, otherization will not be treated as a standalone theme, as it is embedded within the gender regime itself. At this point, the two dominant analytical approaches in the literature will be introduced. Afterwards, the article will unearth the history of exclusion and otherness, first under the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. KE discussion was on whether the *hum* pronoun would include non-Muslims from different Abrahamic religions outside the "dominant nation" (Depenheuer, 2006: 50; Tekin, 2000: 152). The JDP's predecessors' political exploits and rhetoric will disclose the *hum*. Penultimately, in modern Turkey, it will be claimed that the source of legitimacy may still be a contentious topic. Therefore, the disputes surrounding the verse will be covered. The JDP's populist program in the post-2011 epoch, infused with paternalism, namely paternalistic populism, does not confer feminist women, who are considered non-*hum*. The closing statements will be delineated questions –evoking Pettersson (Pettersson, 1998: 5), are *hum*'s silhouettes demarcated by the gender and where are the lines generated between non-*hum* and *hum* as these identities are politicised– led.

1. METHODOLOGY

The account of otherness from the KE debates until today through the concept of *hum* to the JDP era (2011-21) necessitates a temporal distinction. The latter will be periodized as the FCE of the Ottoman Empire and the center-right antecedents of the JDP in the 20th century, namely the DP and the JP³, and the

³ It is fair to ask why the parties of Erbakan and the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) of T. Türkeş were not selected as the JDP's forerunners. In theory, the JDP, unlike the aforementioned ones, was a centre-right party during 2002-2011. Per contra, scholars like Çınar, Arıkan, and Aslan

JDP era (2011-21). This article excludes the 2002–2011 period of JDP rule, as the political and legal reforms implemented during these years—particularly those aimed at democratization—along with the party’s approach to the gender regime, markedly differed from the post-2011 period.

Since the gender policies of the JDP cannot be analyzed as a single entity, this article covers the period between 2011 and 2021. One might argue that 2011 signifies the inception of the authoritarian inclinations of the JDP. Invoking different thinkers (Mutluer, 2019; 101; Tansel, 2018; Özbudun, 2006; Eligür, 2014), a case might be presented that 2011 marked the year when the erosion of political and social liberties began, alongside the implementation of a self-proclaimed “conservative democracy” characterized by authoritarian elements. 2011 was also a year when a significant institutional change was implemented. The General Directorate of Women’s Status and Problems was replaced with the Ministry of the Family and Social Policies (United Nations, 2004; 17; Kandiyoti, 2015). This institutional restructuring within the state indicates that women’s concerns are going to be approached through the concept of family rather than individual rights and liberties. The latter indicated that policies concerning rights of women will be examined in the setting of “family centralism” (Z. Yılmaz, 2015; 380). Per contra, 2021 is poised to be a crucial element in the paternalistic populism of the JDP, stemming from the party’s move to exit the Istanbul Convention. For De Vos, the convention is significant as it acknowledges violence against women as a kind of violence based on gender (De Vos, 2020). However, it is important to note that 2021 is not the conclusion but rather a turning point. With the chronological framework in place, it is now possible to address the research approach.

This study adopts a *longue durée* perspective to trace the evolution and functioning of the *hum* across the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. As Braudel (Braudel, 2018: 74) notes, *longue durée* captures the seemingly unchanging structures around which faster-moving histories unfold. In line with the latter, the article, following Braudel (Braudel, 2018; 3, 71), distinguishes *longue durée* from the “history of short, sharp, nervous vibrations” –*l’histoire événementielle* (the history of events). By doing so, the readers might trace *hum*’s slowly moving historical development and discover how it influenced the constitutionalism debates in the 19th century’s last decades and the gender regime of the JDP. It demonstrates that the content of *hum* has evolved in interaction with religious,

portray the NMP as being an extreme-right party (Çınar & Arıkan, 2002: 25; Aslan, 2016). Furthermore, researchers like Vielhaber and Kartal depict Erbakan’s political philosophy as dominated by anti-secular and anti-Western views (Vielhaber, 2012; Kartal, 2020). One might argue that, with the effect of being the ruling party, the JDP executed moderate policies during the epoch. Moreover, whilst the JDP has been the ruling party, the others did not have a chance to become the major partner of the governments.

political, and historical factors, rather than remaining a fixed concept. Accordingly, the concept of *hum* that we have customarily taken for granted as unquestionably true, universal, and comprehensively applicable is actually a product of our own time. One, echoing Baykan (Baykan, 1994: 102), should not evaluate *hum*'s social-cultural setting through the prism of a constant, essentialist, and omnipotent Islam to "orientalize" the notion; consideration must be given to the ever-changing nature of history, as well as external influences on the world at large. The presentation of *longue durée* enables the methodological framework of the article.

This study is not limited to just *longue durée*. This article conceptualizes the notion of *hum* through Crenshawian intersectionality. It aims to contribute to the feminism literature by attempting to move discussions on *hum* beyond grammar and the late Ottoman period by using a Crenshawian intersectionality of populism, gender, and paternalism as a methodology. Crenshaw describes intersectionality as a prism indicating where power originates and clashes, where it intertwines and overlaps (Crenshaw, 2017). So this article examines its intersectionality with other exclusion lines and rhetoric evolution from the Ottoman Empire to the JDP. It indicates how *hum* maintains its exclusionary character, simultaneously but novelly serving to legitimize the JDP's paternalist populism through its opposition to gender equality. It advocates that the JDP's gendered understanding of *hum* serves as an intersectional otherization machinery that goes beyond religion, grammar, and social class. In this context, the intersection of the concept of *hum* and the JDP's gender regime between 2011 and 2021 was addressed through a qualitative analysis.

Primary sources were systematically analyzed through content analysis. The party program of the DP, the program and statute of the JP, its election manifesto, and Erdoğan's speeches accessible via the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey's official site between 2014 and 2021 constitute the primary sources of the article. To systematically conduct a gender-based approach to the *hum* debate in modern Turkey, secondary sources were classified thematically. Articles, books, and book chapters written by different academics on gender and feminism, populism and politics, and Ottoman and modern Turkish history, and newspaper reports, including Erdoğan's speeches before 2014, constitute the secondary sources of this article.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In line with Braudel's distinction between *longue durée* and *l'histoire événementielle*, populism, conservatism, and otherization might be read as "short, sharp, nervous vibrations", and *hum* as an example of *longue durée*. Therefore, the

concepts of gender, populism, conservatism, and otherization position themselves according to *hum*.

Since this article is a gender-based analysis, it is crucial to address the JDP's gender regime literature and discussions of otherization. However, because its gender regime also includes otherization, the concept will not be treated as a separate topic. When examining this debate, one might claim that two main approaches stand out. The first approach is populist and blends the notion of otherization into the discussion. The second, rooted in conservatism, pays attention to women's gender roles in the family while seeking to elucidate their attempted marginalization out of the public realm.

Since the party's discourse of otherization is molded by women belonging to the "pure people" and a feminist elite that has no connection with the beliefs and civilization of society, it would be useful to discuss its gender regime and discussions of otherization. Otherization studies are crucial because they indicate how "certain groups" are excluded and discriminated against. The literature on the party's gender regime is also significant because it demonstrates how women are subjected to a patriarchal structure. Scholars like Kourou, Özkazanç, Yılmaz, and Shakil shed light on the JDP's gender regime through the lens of populism. Kourou examines the correlation linking right-wing populism and anti-gender efforts and initiatives by means of the JDP, which has received women's support since it came to power. According to her, anti-feminist populism now serves as an electoral tactic for the JDP in the shift from a gender equality-centered approach to a family-centered approach in the political field (Kourou, 2020; 207, 208, 220). While Kourou explicates how the JDP achieved its vote-winning mechanism through anti-feminist discourse, Özkazanç focuses on the transformation of the JDP after 2011. Özkazanç explains how the JDP, showing itself as a conservative-democratic-center-right party between 2002 and 2011, transformed with authoritarian, nationalist-populist rhetoric through a gendered "us-them" divide. According to the party, the archetype of this divide is the feminists who try to undermine the family and defend adultery (Özkazanç, 2020). This reveals how gendered narratives are instrumentalized by JDP to draw moral boundaries and define political enemies. Yılmaz and Shakil's, on the other hand, explore the layers of interaction between Özkazanç's duality of "us and them" through the lens of "gender populism". They argue that the concept of gender significantly influenced the reconstruction of Turkish identity and people throughout the JDP period, and that this brought the concept of "gender populism" to the fore, as the employment of gender imagery, language, policy procedures, and criticism of gender subjects by populist figures (İ. Yılmaz and Shakil; 2023; 2). At this juncture, the party portrays women and LGBTQI+ individuals as civilizational enemies and marginalizes them with weaponized gender populism (İ. Yılmaz and Shakil;

2023; 2, 4). Ünal uses the concept of “opportunistic synergy” when explaining the JDP’s gender regime. She defines the concept as the alignment between government agencies and anti-gender civil society actors. Ünal stresses that the concept is especially noticeable in the populist communication techniques and affective politics that are frequently employed by the party and illiberal anti-gender actors (Ünal, 2015; 10, 14, 16). This approach, in turn, brings us back to the very point we seek to reconsider.

At this point, it might be claimed that the *hum* debates constitute the intersection of the two debates. The concept of *hum*, extending from the debates over the KE to the present day, determines who constitutes “us” in the dynamic “us-other” divide within populism. In other words, *hum* functions as a bisector that defines the space of “us” and “other”. Therefore, by defining *hum* as the bisector of both the late Ottoman “dominant nation-constitutionalism-non-Muslims” triangle and today’s “gender-populism-exclusionary mechanisms” triangle, this article, as a contribution to the literature, aspires to bridge the grammatical-legal debates of the KE era and the gender regime targeting feminists and LGBTQI+ individuals in modern Turkey. Therefore, the multilayered nature of the concept of *hum*—on the one hand, members of different Abrahamic religions outside the “dominant nation” of the late Ottoman period and, on the other, feminists and LGBTQI+ individuals—enables the intersection of concepts of legitimacy and gender equality.

An alternative approach views the party’s gender regime through the lens of conservatism. In this context, Süslü and Halifeoğlu suggest that the JDP’s women’s policy reflects a conservative outlook, framing women through roles like mother and wife, in accordance with traditional gender norms. Nonetheless, these roles confine women to motherhood and wifedom. At this point, what is expected from the women and the JDP’s Women’s Branch, which does not have its own statute, is to strictly follow the *Reis* (leader) (Süslü, Halifeoğlu, 2023; 232, 251, 252, 255). Meanwhile, a second line of inquiry identifies the JDP’s gender regime in its initial EU-driven reform strategy. For Ayata and Doğangün, since the JDP, at the beginning, thought that the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Human Rights could safeguard civil, political, and religious rights as human rights, it decided to adhere to gender equality. With no outside pressures for democratization, the gender atmosphere changed into a religiously conservative one, leaving its formerly egalitarian feature, with an important emphasis on custom and religion, following the partial suspension of the negotiations. Nonetheless, the latter facilitated the spread of patriarchal ideals and women’s confinement to family roles, which polarizes social understanding of gender interactions and rigidly splits social sphere into female-associated and male-associated realms (Ayata, Doğangün, 2017; 612, 615, 622).

3. THE ACCOUNT OF OTHERNESS FROM THE KANUN-U ESASİ DEBATES UNTIL TODAY THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF *HUM*

One might argue that perceptions of the history of exclusion and otherness—from the KE debates to the present—are shaped by the notion of *hum*, whose proper understanding first requires an inquiry into its origins. Surah *Ali 'Imran*, *veşâvir hümm fil'emr*, according to the Qur'an, is the verse that orders the authorities to consult *hum* when making judgment or doing something (The Qur'an, 3:159). With *veşâvir hümm fil'emr* statement, attention is drawn to the loci of the state and the affairs of the people, as the *raison d'être* of the state (Tezcan, 2010: 103). The verse declares that the Prophet Muhammad's moderate attitude towards those fleeing the Battle of Uhud was approved by God (Berkes, 2003: 321; Tezcan, 2010: 96). The consent of the *hum* gives legitimacy to political decisions. A productive starting point, therefore, is to ask why Muslims have historically felt compelled to accept governmental authority—and, closely related to this, why they have complied with particular systems of rule. Following Özdemir and Visagie (Özdemir, 2012: 71; Visagie, 2014: 28), legitimacy, defined as the general acknowledgement of political authority, in the eyes of Muslims, bestows on an Islamic order a compulsory feature –namely sharia– thus converts power into authority. Drawing on Levitov (Levitov, 2016: 5), the legitimacy of an Islamic political edifice, therefore, will stem from its skill to materialize a divinely intended design of social organization. Nevertheless, the controversial point is who they are, who is included, and who is not. What exactly is meant by *hum*: is it the general will of the indivisible Islamic community in a Rousseauian sense, a majoritarian Islamic rule that possesses the risk to transform into a tyranny of majority or a democratic rule with Islamic overtones? This was the very case during the debates regarding KE, the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire. “The most heated debates on the KE eventually turned into a grammatical debate” (Oktay, 1991). Following Oğur (Oğur, 2021), it might be claimed that the language conveyed expressed this immediately during the constitution making process: the words describing “us” –Muslims- and words defining “strangers” –non-Muslims- appeared together. Invoking Berktaş (Berktaş, 2021), one might argue that, because the otherizing Muslims embraced a belief in the one true God—entailing the denial of the equivalence and legitimacy of other religions—their identity was perceived as vulnerable to dissolution through contact with the outside world. “Us” and “them” assumed defined forms inside this worry's context. Thus, while one group included all “the subjects of the empire” within the scope of the pronoun, regardless of the nation, another group encompassed merely those who belonged to “Islam” (Berkes, 2003: 326; Oktay, 1991; Tekin, 2000: 152).

Most, if not all, of the ulama were against the KE (Berkes, 2003: 324). Nonetheless, the ulama were not monolithic in their political opposition to it:

According to the first view, only the sharia of the imam of the Muslims, the sultan, is binding on the Muslims, and according to the second, the existence of the KE and the national assembly meant accepting the Christians as legislators that fed the fear that the conditionality would undermine the law of the Muslims (Oktay, 1991; Tekin, 2000; 152; Berkes, 2003; 324). The latter articulated that the pronoun “*hum*” in the verses about “consultation” in the Qur’an is only for Muslims. One of the most outspoken opponents of the KE was the Fatwa Consultant Halil Efendi. He, who suggested the establishment of a “scientific committee” instead of a parliament, articulated that “You are the people the state trusts...Are you going to gather some ignorant Turks of Anatolia and Rumelia and ask them for their votes? Execute every business according to justice; when in doubt about something, apply for the fatwa of the Shaykh al-Islam” (Berkes, 2003: 314; Karal, 2000: 214). Following Hasanović (2015: 1), given that the link between legitimacy and democracy was then relatively novel, one might argue that, for the fatwa consultant, the term “democracy”—due to its mass-based nature—carried belittling connotations, evoking a sense of ochlocracy or mob rule. Above and beyond the ulama, the prominent figures from the top of the state were also against it. For instance, the words of the Grand Vizier Rüşti Pasha echoed Halil Efendi. In the opinion of the Grand Vizier, “One cannot rule the Ottoman people with constitutionalism... The Ottoman people were not mature enough for a regime based on popular representation. Ignorant people would abuse their freedom of choice” (Karal, 2000: 213; Berkes, 2003: 314).

Furthermore, the supporters of the KE were not uniform in their political support to it either. It is worth mentioning the difference of opinion between poet Namık Kemal and Midhat Pasha. These opposing views made themselves evident in how the state should be organized. The concepts of democracy and equality played a vital role in N. Kemal’s semantic world. He thought that Islamic sharia provided a philosophical basis for parliamentary rule and the Ottoman constitution (Mardin, 1991: 118). Put differently, invoking Çağan and Mardin (Çağan, 2012: 267; Mardin, 1991: 96), one might argue that the KE was the reflection of the concepts and institutions of western political terminology such as democracy, parliament, public opinion, and elections in the form of Islam-based concepts such as *usul-ü meşveret*, *şura*, *ehli hall vel akd*, and *biat* in the context of his Ottomanism ideal. He strove to reconcile modern Western societies with traditional Islamic ones through political theory and philosophy, the desire to create a synthesis (Çağan, 2012: 262). Thus, he, at the end of the day, came up with a strict centralism and argued for a council of the ummah as a control mechanism since a federal organization would dismantle the Ottoman unity (Mardin, 1991: 90; Berkes, 2003: 312; Fazlıoğlu, 2014; Çağan, 2012: 268). Per contra, Midhat Pasha, unlike the autocratic modernization policies of the Tanzimat Reform era, was the representative of the new mentality in an old

empire that was modernizing and trying to keep up with the times (Ortaylı, 2007: 77; Söğütü, 2010: 110). He embarked on a mobilization to prepare for the objective conditions of modernization and turn it into a process of social change (Söğütü, 2010). It might be argued that, in this effort which culminated with the KE, following Çetinsaya, Buzpınar, and Berkes (Çetinsaya, Buzpınar, 2020: 10; Berkes, 2003: 312), three interrelated factors guided Midhat Pasha's policy: Ottomanism, consultation (*meşveret*)/constitutionalism, and an expanded decentralization inspired by the German union model. Motivated by the English political model, Midhat Pasha firmly believed that the Ottoman Empire could be saved merely by a government with a national assembly (Tamçelik, 2000: 1015). For him, the axis of the new administration, hence, will be a national assembly, seated by the Muslim and Christian members of the Ottoman subjects, which does not discriminate against race or sect, unlike N. Kemal (Söğütü, 2010: 107; Fazlıoğlu, 2014; Çağan, 2012: 268; Tamçelik, 2000: 1016). Thus, following Ortaylı (Ortaylı, 2007: 77), it might be argued that Midhat Pasha perceived the KE as a style of administration that would assist both Muslims and Christians to embrace the state in order to create an Ottoman upper identity. While both figures contributed to the shaping of the constitutional framework, the deeper aspirations and the ideological underpinnings of the KE itself remain open to critical scrutiny.

Indeed, the very ambitions associated with the KE have also been subject to various criticisms. A case might be made that the Young Ottomans perceived the KE as an ideological tool and utilized the concept of *hum* to legitimize it. Consistent with this interpretation, it might be asserted that the KE was not a tool for founding a brand new political edifice following the denunciation of the old structure. For Koçak, the Young Ottomans' demand for a constitution was instrumental: for them, the constitution was not an objective; it was a means of reforming the Ottoman state (Çağan, 2012: 260). For Koçak, since the Young Ottomans did not perceive the KE as a genuine necessity of the diverse divisions of Ottoman society, the constitutional system it created functioned as a cloak. What we saw when we removed the cloak was actually the defense and hence legitimization of the rights and responsibilities of the absolutist monarchy. He argued that the system they founded provided a constitutional guarantee for the traditional rights of the absolute monarchy under the guise of a constitutional monarchy. "...the state-religion union acquired official legitimacy for the first time in this law. In this sense, the KE might be interpreted as an effort to maintain the old structure in the guise of a set of principles that embodies itself as a modern governance system by utilizing *hum* rhetorically. Consequently, Articles 3, 4, 5, and 13 provided a religious foundation for legitimacy to the monarch's unconditional powers as well" (Berkes, 2003: 334). To sum up, it might be asserted that for the Young Ottomans, the demands of the Ottoman public were not perceived as an end in itself. Thus, it might be asserted that the absence of

legitimacy caused by the instrumental usage of the KE made it easier for II. Abdülhamid to abolish it in 1878. The next section will trace the reemergence of *hum* in modern Turkish politics by covering the DP and JP's gender-focused perspective on *hum*.

The Forerunners of the JDP and Gender-Based Approach to *Hum*

Hum that gives legitimacy to political decisions, crystallizes itself in the political discourses of the forerunners of the JDP, the center-right parties, respectively the DP of Menderes, who ended the Republican People's Party's (RPP) 27-year dominance in the 1950 elections –in Menderes' words, “national uprising”– and the JP of S. Demirel that portrayed itself as the successor of the DP in the 1960s. In this section, only the gender axis will be discussed in the intersectionality of the concept of *hum* with the concept of otherization, and other otherizations will be excluded from the article. It might be contended that, at least theoretically, following Honohan, Aytaç and Elçi (Honohan, 2010: 4; Aytaç, Elçi, 2019: 91), the DP was founded by stressing a plural you and hence rejecting the concept of non-*hum*. The latter, founded with a democratic vision of public politics, championed the political maturity of Turkish women (Demokrat Parti, 1946: 1). Consequently, the party, during those years of political opposition, endeavored to forge its legitimacy in democracy (Özdemir, 2012: 191). Nevertheless, it might be argued that, in the post-1950 period, the DP, the most beautiful girl, who reads Democracy magazine and dresses elegantly, as depicted in caricatures –unlike the RPP's representation of as a fat and ugly girl– (Deniz, 2006: 90) executed gendered policies by perceiving and portraying women as part of a non-*hum* that lacks political development. Concretely, following Mert, Yıldız and, de Haan (de Haan, 2012: 14, Mert, 2020: 223; Aydın, Yıldız, 2016: 59), it might be argued that the party did not believe that Turkish women possessed the political development to read publications belonging to the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) that defied gender inequalities and strove to construct a fictitious global society of progressive women. Together with an international perspective, in an effort to preserve good relations with the American administration and to prevent women's associations from contacting socialist associations, the DP prohibited the import and distribution of them in 1952. Menderes' party aspired women's associations to progress under its own framework and control and not to go beyond the Turkish state's official ideology (Mert, 2020: 223; Aydın, Yıldız, 2016: 59). Nevertheless, it might be claimed that by restricting Turkish women's freedom of speech, the party hindered efforts to limit government power.

Another reflection of its gendered policy was the refusal by it of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (CNMW), which aspired to materialize that “everyone has the right to a nationality”, and nobody will be

arbitrarily stripped of his/her nationality or stopped from altering it in 1957 (United Nations, 1957: 7). Following Koçer (Koçer, 2009: 85), therefore, it might be advocated that Turkish women have been prevented from having the rights of ownership, administration, usufruct, savings, and inheritance on the goods they have acquired before and during marriage, the capacity to benefit from and use the rights, and the freedom of travel, on equal terms with men. Last but not least, the overall total of women deputies within the Turkish Parliament fell to 3 in 1950, 4 in 1954, and 8 in 1957 (B. Yılmaz, 2010: 45). The ones, except for figures like Adivar of the DP, who were maybe anticipated to protect women's rights foremost, remained extremely passive, and their representation was confined to issues like education and health (Koçer, 2009: 156, 157; B. Yılmaz, 2010: 46).

The JP, led by Demirel since 1964, aspired to establish a Turkish social edifice in accordance with modern Western civilization, a democratic regime, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adalet Partisi, 1966: 89, 90). However, the party's gendered discourse about women was in contradiction with its program and covenant. To start with, "it contemplates the nation as a whole with its peasants, citizens, workers, civil servants, shopkeepers, self-employed, merchants, industrialists, women, men, young, and old" (Adalet Partisi, 1973: 90). Nonetheless, its holistic approach to the concept of a nation is subject to criticism. Following Sumbas and Baykan (Sumbas, 2015: 111; Baykan, 1994: 105), the methodology hinders the representation and public presence of Turkish women's interests and Turkish women's political identity as a subject of social change, a political subject, and an interest group in Turkey. Next, if one is to dismantle the imagined women concept of the party, what is crystallized are motherhood, household, and sacredness. The women appear in the party manifestos as a mother figure who would raise the future virtuous, patriotic, and nationalist Turkish generations and manage the household (Adalet Partisi, 1961: 23, 1965: 9, 1969: 63). Perhaps the ramifications of these indicate themselves in the attribution of sanctity to the Turkish woman within the framework of the Turkish family (Adalet Partisi, 1969: 63, 1973: 75). The rhetoric of the party reduced everything to a Manichean distinction, the "noble" –*hum*, virtuous and nationalist Turkish women doing the housework– and the "immoral" –non-*hum*, individual women who strive for sexual equality.

The party's gendered discourse on women was also evident in active political life. According to Çadır, the function of the party's women's organization merely consisted of "women's activities" such as balls, tea organizations, and neighborhood meetings (Çadır, 2011: 56). Furthermore, this was not even sustainable policy: "The efforts and engagements of the women's organization of the party were short-term and oriented towards the elections..." (Çadır, 2011: 57). Similarly, following Arat (Arat, 2012: 264), one can argue that the DP and JP took a dichotomous stance on equality, emphasizing women's responsibilities as

spouses and mothers whilst simultaneously recognizing equality. However, one can argue that one pole of the dichotomy has gradually faded into the background. The next section will examine the JDP's gender-based approach to *hum*, bringing readers closer to the present day, the decade between 2011 and 2021.

The JDP and Gender-Based Approach to *Hum*

Who counts as *hum* cannot be defined merely by gender. When Crenshaw's intersectionality concept is used as a prism, the interaction of the notion of *hum* with other exclusion lines might help determine what kind of stratified otherization policies Turkish people confront in the decade. This lens reveals that gender-based exclusion is not a standalone occurrence but is deeply ingrained within broader structures of political otherization, such as ethnicity, class, and ideological dissent—each reinforcing the boundaries of who is rendered non-*hum* in varying contexts.

During the post-2011 period of the JDP, it has become possible to observe multiple systems of otherization operating simultaneously. In the initial system, gender advocacy and leftism are inextricably interconnected. For Amnesty International (AI), the then-Prime Minister Erdoğan held a demonstration in Hopa during the 2011 parliamentary elections. Some, including retired teacher Metin Lokumcu, sought a press conference in Hopa, arguing that hydroelectric power plant constructions in the Eastern Black Sea region were destroying the region's natural landscape. But during the attempt to give a press statement, Lokumcu was killed by a heart attack during the police intervention (Amnesty International, 01.07.2021). The incident was widely protested by many. Dilşat Aktaş, a leading figure from the Community Centers who joined the protests, was criticized by Erdoğan in a sexist tone, saying: "Is she a woman or a girl? I do not even know!" (CNN Türk, 04.06.2011). One might argue that Erdoğan's statements about Aktaş were not only due to his own understanding of gender. He used these statements in response to her leftism and exercising her right to protest. The second system reveals a convergence between feminist politics and ethnic identity. One of the organizations closed down by Decree Law No. 676 following the July 15 coup attempt was Jin News Agency (JNA), the world's first women-run news agency (Jin Haber, 20.09.2016). Staffed entirely by women, the agency aimed to break the media's masculine and militaristic narrative (Jin Haber, 20.09.2016; Kamer, 2016; Tahaoğlu, 2013). In line with the latter, it "...conducted gender discrimination training for all its employees before it commenced broadcasting" (Doğan Haber Ajansı, 07.03.2012). It might be claimed that women working at the JNA were excluded for their ethnic identity and feminist stance. Here, the gender of female journalists is intertwined with their ethnic identities. "The unfortunate thing about our agency is that Kurdish women in Turkey founded it", says Fatma Koçak, one of its editors (Kamer, 2016). In essence, *hum*

intersects and overlaps with leftism and ethnicity. This intersectional understanding reveals that *hum* cannot be grasped solely through gender but is a layered collection of intersecting exclusion lines.

Since the 2011 era of the JDP government, its paternalistic populism has systematically excluded feminist women considered part of the non-*hum* category alongside the LGBTQI+ individuals, atheists, politically active Kurds, and practicing Alawites, though this discussion specifically focuses on feminist women. Consequently, they are neither consulted nor acknowledged in policymaking processes. Drawing on Üstel and Kundakcı (Üstel, 2004; Kundakcı, 2013: 69), the non-*hum* may be defined as the citizen non grata of the JDP: “the perilous one”, the one capable of disrupting the socio-political order and undermining Turkish traditions and norms that safeguard the running of the order. Accordingly, perceiving a decline in its political power, the JDP seeks to consolidate Islam as the common sociopolitical denominator, and deepens the divide between us and non-*hum*. Thus, the non-*hum*, following Irigaray (Cavarero, Bertolino, 2008: 133), might be defined as Turkish women who were not transformed and subjugated by masculine symbolic order. Specifically, drawing on Cavarero and Bertolino (Cavarero, Bertolino, 2008: 133), contemporary Turkish feminists might be defined as women who are present, in substance, possessing “a face, a name, a story, a voice...” whose distinctiveness is uncovered and circulated by other Turkish men and women. Nevertheless, the JDP’s perspective on women is still a reflection of a more traditional society. Invoking Oktay (Oktay, 1991: 17), it can be asserted that modern-day Turkish women are not perceived as entities independent of their social status. Alternatively stated, following Benhabib (Benhabib, 2004: 1), one might argue that individual women who are part of the *hum* become “we”, whereas non-*hum* women have been alienated and reduced to “others”. Thus, following Oktay (Oktay, 1991: 17), it can be advocated that, unlike in western societies where women have a value regardless of social status, non-*hum* women (i.e., in the Atwoodian sense, “unwomen” [Atwood, 1998]) are unimportant in terms of the JDP in the post-2011 era. However, following Honohan (Honohan, 2010: 4), it might be argued that the Turkish political community had better rely less on the presence of a “we” figuring out ourselves than on a plural “you” on whom rights and entitlements of justice depend.

Following Kundakcı (Kundakcı, 2013: 76), one might argue that the acceptance and representation of diversity in the public sphere in Turkey is still problematic. These dynamics are reflected in President Erdoğan’s sexist discourse, which draws on distinctions between the “normal” and the “abnormal” in line with his paternalistic populism—particularly in relation to womanhood, motherhood, birth control, and equality. The *hum* of Erdoğan hence the JDP, has

a clear religious overtone with his stress on creation –“Women and men cannot be made equal. It contradicts the creation (Tüysüz, 2016; Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 24.11.2014)”, Farewell Sermon of the Beloved Prophet – “We are looking at the Farewell Sermon of our Beloved Prophet”, and Muslim family –“birth control is not acceptable to any Muslim family.” (The Guardian, 30.05.2016; Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 17.02.2015, 30.05.2016). Then the *hum*, in the eyes of Erdoğan, that had better be consulted is a woman that has at least three children, rejects family planning and birth control, is not after equality but equivalence with men, and equates motherhood with womanhood. Erdoğan also conveys this in his own words. “Some may not want to be mothers. But I know that motherhood is the position that elevates a woman to the highest level... A woman who rejects motherhood and relinquishes managing her household is in danger of compromising her originality; she is incomplete, partial” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 05.06.2016; 08.03.2016). In line with the above-mentioned points, following Kundakcı (2013: 77), one might contend that in Erdoğan’s eyes, non-*hum*, which is not in accordance with gender intelligibility standards, lacks social, legal, and political validity. For instance, when in 2004, the JDP strove to criminalize adultery and feminists from various platforms and organizations objected to the proposal, the party portrayed the feminists as a marginal group of women. Following Parmaksız (2016: 46), one can argue that the JDP’s paternalist framing of the family provided a model for organizing Turkish social and political life, thereby legitimizing and reinforcing state authoritarianism.

This section will conclude with a holistic analysis of how the JDP’s paternalism echoes its predecessors’ gender distinctions. The DP’s ban on WIDF’s publications and its rejection of the CNMW highlight a conception of gender that denies women’s individuality and requires them to be “protected.” In this respect, the JDP’s replacement of the GDWSP with the MFSP and the cooperation protocol between the MFSP and the DRA are like the DP’s practices. In both cases, the parties in power impose a conservative gender understanding on women for the “good” of women through state paternalism. The latter undermines the women’s agency, diversity, and autonomy by imposing a uniform understanding of gender roles. One can argue that the JP’s approach that reduces women’s position to motherhood and housework has been reflected in the JDP. For example, the JDP’s pronatalist policies and rejection of family planning and birth control can be considered within this scope. This policy of the JDP becomes clear in Erdoğan’s own words. For him, “the family consists of mother and father and the people disturbed by the three-child policy are enemies of this nation” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 08.03.2018). The structures of both parties that exclude women from the public realm and limit them to the functions of housewives, caretakers, and mothers are also noticeable in their political

organizations. The JDP's women's branch organization lacks a separate statute, reflecting a paternalist understanding that denies women's agency and diversity plays an important role in this. This suggests that women do not have an autonomous standing within the parties and that the matters that concern women are not visibly identified. The absence of self-governing women's branches indicates that the parties' rhetoric on women and gender equality is performative but not transformative.

3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Finally, one might contend that Erdoğan's populism is visibly religious and hence pretends to execute the aspirations of God, sanctifying his cause. The latter embodies itself in the Manichean distinction of us, the focal point of Erdoğan's political message, –God-fearing, devout female supporters of the party: *hum* (“the people”) and the ones who champion gender equality, the presumed adversaries of the Turkish people (Aytaç, Elçi, 2019; Connell, 2020: 108; Kandiyoti, 2016: 105; Zúquete, 2017: 446). Furthermore, bearing in mind that women, the party's conservatism's historical emblem, are the focal bridge between the party and its supporters, the rhetoric of Erdoğan, following Kaul, Ayata, and Doğangün (Kaul, 2021: 1632; Ayata, Doğangün, 2017: 616), is more than a dog whistle and confines what Turkish women are allowed to do. Following Zúquete (Zúquete, 2017: 450), the ramification is the sacralization of Turkish politics: It takes on a transcendent quality, no longer an ordinary and constrained experience, the “spiritual vacuum” of Turkish politics. Hence, the Turkish people are transformed and sanctified, and their enemies are fought as the personification of immorality and badness (Zúquete, 2017: 452). In other words, and drawing on Srinivasan (Srinivasan, 2021: 106), what unfolded during this period in Turkey may be seen as a prefigurative politics, where individual transformation gives way to collective political transfiguration.

At this point in time, echoing Pettersson (Pettersson, 1998: 5), one might ask whether *hum*'s contours shaped by gender distinctions, and where the boundaries created between non-*hum* and *hum* emerge as identities become politicized. Following this line of thought, the dichotomous perception of gender permeates Turkish political rhetoric. The power structure is thus obscured and maintained by gender's often soundless influence; perceived as natural, gender hierarchies stay intact. So, the self-other and us-them distinctions in the context of *hum* are profoundly entrenched in gender hierarchies.

The *hum* maintains its ability to otherize even if the persons and groups it marginalizes change. This indicates that it is not an anachronistic linguistic concept that derives its origin from the Qur'an, but rather a concept with a

dynamic structure. Its connection with the concept of gender particularly indicates how dynamically the notion has been formed by forging other novel others.

The theoretical discussions above find concrete manifestations in Turkish political life, particularly through the lens of gender. For Ünal, the biggest intellectual and emotional differences between the contemporary West and Islam has surfaced in gender relations during Turkey's modernization (Ünal, 2015: 14). It might be advocated that women in Turkey are politically and socially engaged through diverse socioeconomic and political interests stemming from their gender roles and relations, necessitating the involvement of women, with their differences, in decisions about politics. Nevertheless, invoking Sumbas (2015: 111) and Baykan (1994: 110), despite being a political subject and an interest group depending on both their subjective and holistic differences, Turkish women –“the slaves of the slaves”– have historically been excluded from political decision-making. This exclusion persists today, albeit in subtler forms, as structural barriers to full political representation and agency remain.

Nevertheless, one might assert that, due to the regime's competitive authoritarian edifice character, unlike the tutelary nature of the preceding era, the decade is a milestone. The regime's competitive authoritarian edifice had a defining effect on the JDP's sense of non-*hum*. It might be contended that the policies of the party during this epoch have strengthened the otherization of non-*hum* to the point where it is tough for society to coexist. It might be stated that, echoing Pettersson (1998: 7), in Turkey, under the rule of Erdoğan, gender has been a phrase utilized largely to refer to individuals in subordinate positions, not to those in positions of authority. Accordingly, in Turkey, when discussing privileged identities –those that belong to men- it is uncommon to bring up the subject of gender. When it comes to policies, in 2011, the GDWSP was substituted by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (United Nations, 2004: 17; Kandiyoti, 2015). Furthermore, the latter and the DRA signed a cooperation protocol in 2011 (Mutluer, 2019: 108). Lastly, the JDP withdrew from the Istanbul Convention in 2021.

Finally, this article has sought to show that *hum* is not a static or purely religious term, but rather a locally rooted, historically mutable and politically instrumental concept that continues to serve as a boundary marker between the legitimate and the illegitimate. The JDP's post-2011 political discourse illustrates how *hum* has been strategically redefined by multiple actors to sustain a gendered, ethnicized, and ideologically polarized political field. Considering the research questions, it is essential to revisit the article's contribution to the literature and engage in a more in-depth discussion from a higher abstract level. Considering the Manichean perspective of the JDP's populism, it might be argued that the JDP's “we” will need a “them” in the future as well. Here, “them” will be presented as

people who seek to disrupt the “purity” of the Turkish family structure and values and undermine motherhood. So, it can be argued that the *hum* will remain in a state of flux, being consistently redefined, interacting with the JDP’s populism. *Hum*, in a Braudelian sense, will continue to function on the border between the mobile and the immobile in the political life of Turkey in the future and will therefore continue its slow-moving historical development. It is precisely this layered and evolving function of *hum*—its capacity to adapt to new authoritarian contexts while retaining its foundational logic of exclusion—that makes it a potent conceptual tool for understanding the gendered contours of political legitimacy in Turkey today.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adalet Partisi (1961), “Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi [1961]”, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/items/8cd103bd-d0f2-4a26-be5d-a3635e3f3405> (19.10.2021).

Adalet Partisi, (1966), “Adalet Partisi Program ve Tüzük”, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/handle/11543/755> (19.10.2021).

Adalet Partisi (1969), “Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi (APSB)”, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/items/4a1e21d9-d418-4e7e-836d-6698770c7878> (19.10.2021).

Adalet Partisi (1973), “Adalet Partisi seçim beyannamesi [1973]”, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/items/838ba621-d665-4859-a86d-3ac27641a343> (19.10.2021).

Amnesty International (01.07.2021), “Metin Lokumcu Davası”, <https://amnesty.org.tr/icerik/metinlokumcudavasi> (22.07.2025).

Arat, Zehra Kabasakal (2012), “Women”, Heper, Metin, Sabri Sayari (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge).

Aslan, Mustafa Çağatay (2016), “The Restrictive Impact of Party Ideology on Party Strategy: Turkey’s Radical Right the Nationalist Movement Party After June 2015 Elections”, İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 55: 67-86.

Atwood, Margaret (1998), The Handmaid’s Tale (New York: Anchor Books).

Aydın, Abdullah and Murat Yıldız (2016), “1950-1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de Kadın Hareketlerinin Niteliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, Yasama Dergisi, 33: 50-67.

Aygün, Mehmet (2014), “‘Yeni’ Neyi Temsil Ediyor? Yeni Fetişizmi ve ‘Yeni Türkiye’ Mitleri”, *Sosyologca*, 8, <https://sosyologca.org/files/sosyologca/8-6.pdf> (29.07.2025).

Aytaç, Selim Erdem and Ezgi Elçi (2019), “Populism in Turkey”, https://researchgate.net/publication/328149081_Populism_in_Turkey (10.10.2021).

Baykan, Ayşegül (1994), “The Turkish Woman”, *Gender & History*, 6 (1): 101-116.

Benhabib, Seyla (2004), “The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens” (Ser. The John Robert Seeley Lectures, 5) (Cambridge University Press).

Berkes, Niyazi (2003), *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi).

Berktaş, Halil (2021), “‘Dış’ Korkusu (2) Hayvanlardan İnsanlara”, <https://serbestiyet.com/yazarlar/dis-korkusu-2-hayvanlardan-insanlara-65898/> (05.11.2022).

Bora, Tanıl (07.06.2016), “Yeni Türkiye”, <https://birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/7718/yeni-turkiye> (28.07.2025).

Bora, Tanıl (2018), *Zamanın Kelimeleri: Yeni Türkiye’nin Siyasî Dili* (İstanbul: İletişim).

Braudel, Fernand (2018), *On History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (Trans. Sarah Matthews).

Cavarero, Adriana and Elisabetta Bertolino (2008), “Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with the Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero”, *Differences*, 19 (1): 128–167.

Christofis, Nikos (2018), “The AKP’s “Yeni Türkiye”: Challenging the Kemalist Narrative?”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 29 (3): 11-32.

CNN Türk, (04.06.2011), “Başbakan: ‘O kadın, kız mıdır kadın mıdır?’”, <https://cnnturk.com/2011/yazarlar/06/04/basbakan.o.kadin.kiz.midir.kadin.midir/618955.0/index.html> (11.10.2021).

Crenshaw, K. (2017), “Kimberlé Crenshaw on intersectionality, more than two decades later”, *Columbia Law School*, 8 (1), <https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/kimberle-crenshaw-intersectionality-more-two-decades-later> (20.04.2025).

Çadır, Mustafa (2011), “Kadının Siyasal Yaşama Katılımında Siyasi Parti Kadın Kollarının Rolü”, <https://ailevecalisma.gov.tr/media/2524/mustafacadir.pdf> (10.10.2021).

Çağan, Kenan (2012), “Namık Kemal’de Devletin Niteliği ve Temel Dayanakları”, *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, 7 (1): 255-280.

Çagaptay, Soner (2020), *The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing).

Çetinsaya, Gökhan and Ş. Tufan Buzpınar (2020), “Midhat Paşa”, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/midhat-pasa> (09.08.2021).

Çınar, Alev and Burak Arıkan (2002), “The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?”, *Turkish Studies*, 3 (1): 25-40.

De Haan, Francisca (2012), “The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF): History, Main Agenda, and Contributions, 1945-1991”, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/soc_fem/files/de_haan_widf_2012_wasi_essay_with_location_added.doc (09.11.2021).

De Vos, Berthe (2020), “The Intent and Importance of the Istanbul Convention”, <https://sorooptimistinternational.org/2020/09/11/the-intent-and-importance-of-the-istanbul-convention/> (09.11.2021).

Demokrat Parti (1946), „Demokrat Parti Programı [1946]“, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/items/3bf0ffa7-72ba-4c30-b434-997981e900bc> (19.10.2021).

Deniz, Didem (2006), *1950 Seçimleri Demokrat Parti İzmir Propagandası (Yüksek Lisans Tezi)* (İzmir: DEÜ Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü).

Depenheuer, Otto (2006), *Minorities in Turkey and in the EU* (Berlin: LIT Verlag).

Doğan Haber Ajansı (07.03.2012), “Türkiye’nin ilk kadın haber ajansı ‘JINHA’”, https://web.archive.org/web/20161221123110/http://www.dha.com.tr/turkiyenin-ilk-kadin-haber-ajansi-jinha_282070.html (07.10.2021).

Eligür, Banu (2014), “Turkey's Declining Democracy”, <https://hudson.org/research/10525-turkey-s-declining-democracy> (25.10.2021).

Fazlıoğlu, Mehmet Alp (2014), “1876 Kanun-ı Esasîsi: ‘Türkiye Hükümet-i Meşrûta Sırasına Dahil Olmuştur’”, <http://www.zindekuvvet.com/1876-kanun-i-esasi-turkiye-hukumet-i-mesruta-sirasina-dahil-olmustur/> (11.10.2021).

Gaus, Daniel (2013), “Rational Reconstruction as a Method of Political Theory Between Social Critique and Empirical Political Science”, *Constellations*, 20 (4): 553–570.

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe and Gökten Doğangün, (2017), “Gender politics of the AKP: Restoration of a religio-conservative gender climate”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 19 (6): 610-627.

Hasanović, Jasmin (2015), “Ochlocracy in the Practices of Civil Society: A Threat for Democracy?” *Studia Juridica et Politica Jaurinensis*, VL-2, https://www.academia.edu/26803846/Ochlocracy_in_the_Practices_of_Civil_Society_A_Threat_for_Democracy (25.10.2021).

Honohan, Iseult (2010), “Democracy Across Borders: from Demos to Demoï”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 18 (4): 581-585.

Jin Haber (20.09.2016), “#JINHAsusturulamaz: Dünyanın ilk kadın haber ajansı JINHA kapatıldı!”, <http://jinhaber1.com/search/content/view/66519?page=1&key=0dfb4249776c48d4f83ad0b082f416a2> (27.07.2025).

Kamer, Hatice (2016), “Son KHK ile kapatılan basın kuruluşlarının temsilcileri ne diyor?”, <https://bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-37815246> (29.07.2025).

Kandiyoti, Deniz (2015), “The Gender Wars in Turkey: A Litmus Test of Democracy?”, <https://opendemocracy.net/en/5050/gender-wars-in-turkey-litmus-test-of-democracy/> (03.10.2021).

Kandiyoti, Deniz (2016), “Locating The Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-Liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey”, *Research and Policy on Turkey*, 1 (2): 103-118.

Karal, Enver Ziya (2000), *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 8. Cilt: Birinci Mesrutiyet ve Istibdat Devirleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu).

Kartal, Rabia Nur (2020), “A Brief Critical Analysis of National Vision Movement on Theoretical and Practical Level: Erbakan’s Model of Teo-Democracy”, *Avrasya Sosyal ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 7 (7): 143-154.

Kaul, Nitasha (2021), “The Misogyny of Authoritarians in Contemporary Democracies”, *International Studies Review*, 23 (4): 1619-1645.

Koçer, Dilara Nergishan (2009), *Demokrat Parti Döneminde Kadın: 1950-1960 Arası Kadın Dergilerinde Kadın İmajı (Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi)* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi SBE).

Kourou, Nur Sinem (2020), “Sağ Popülizm ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Karşıtı Hareketlerin Birlikteliğinde AKP Hükümetlerinin Aile Siyaseti ve Popülist Siyasal Mobilizasyonu”, *Feminist Tahayyül Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2 (2): 207-241.

Kundakcı, Seda (2013), “Heteroseksizm ve Ötekileştirme Eleştirisi”, *Liberal Düşünce Dergisi*, 71: 65-79.

Levitov, Alex (2016), “Normative Legitimacy and the State”, <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/41327/chapter/352326915> (14.11.2021).

Mardin, Şerif (1991), *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim).

Mert, Melek Kaymaz (2020), “Türkiye’de Kadın Sivil Toplum Örgütleri: Demokrat Parti Dönemi Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, Saracaloğlu et al., 8. Uluslararası Sosyal Beşeri ve Eğitim Bilimleri Kongresi.

Mudde, Cas (2004), “The Populist Zeitgeist”, *Government and Opposition*, 39 (4): 541–563.

Mudde, Cas (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Mutluer, Nil (2019), “The Intersectionality of Gender, Sexuality, And Religion: Novelties and Continuities in Turkey During the AKP Era”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 19 (1): 99-118.

O'Connell, Jamie (2020), “Representation, Paternalism, and Exclusion: The Divergent Impacts of the AKP’s Populism on Human Rights in Turkey”, Neuman, Gerald L. (Ed.), *Human Rights in a Time of Populism: Challenges and Responses* (Cambridge University Press).

Oğur, Yıldırar (2021), “‘Yabancı’ya Su Yok Noktasına Nasıl Geldik?”, <https://serbestiyet.com/yazarlar/yabanciya-su-yok-noktasina-nasil-geldik-66243/> (11.10.2021).

Oktay, Cemil (1991), *Siyasi Kültür Okumaları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları).

Ortaylı, İlber (2007), *Batılılaşma Yolunda* (Merkez Kitaplar).

Özbudun, Ergun (2006), “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey”, *South European Society and Politics*, 11 (3-4), 543-557.

Özdemir, Hakan (2012), “Demokrat Parti (DP) ile Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)’nin Karşılaştırmalı Tarihsel Analizi”, Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 22 (2): 188-209.

Özkazanç, Alev (2020), “Gender and authoritarian populism in Turkey: The two phases of AKP rule”, <https://opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/gender-and-authoritarian-populism-turkey-two-phases-akp-rule/> (27.07.2025).

Parmaksız, Pınar Melis Yalsalı (2016), “Paternalism, Modernization, and the Gender Regime in Turkey”, *Aspasia*, 10 (1): 40-62.

Pettersson, Maria Stern (1998), “In/securing Identities - an Exploration. Ethnic and Gender Identities, among Maya Women in Guatemala”, *CORE*, 141-178, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16311665.pdf> (06.09.2021).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (24.11.2014), “Adaletin Devreye Girmediği Hiçbir Mesele Hakkaniyetli Şekilde Çözüme Kavuşturulamaz”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/1520/adaletin-devreye-girmediği-hicbir-mesele-hakkaniyetli-sekilde-cozume-kavusturulamaz> (11.10.2021).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (17.02.2015), “Büyük Milletlerin Büyük Dertleri Olur; Aynı Zamanda Büyük Güçleri ve Hedefleri de Olur”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/2794/buyuk-milletlerin-buyuk-dertleri-olur-ayni-zamanda-buyuk-gucleri-ve-hedefleri-de-olur> (11.10.2021).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (08.03.2016), “8 Mart Dünya Kadınlar Günü Resepsiyonu’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/40095/8-mart-dunya-kadinlar-gunu-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-konusma> (26.07.2025).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (30.05.2016), “Bu Ülkenin Bir Tek Evladının Dahi Zayi Olmasına Gönümüz Razi Olmaz”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/44180/bu-ulkenin-bir-tek-evladinin-dahi-zayi-olmasına-gonlumuz-razi-olmaz> (12.10.2021).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (05.06.2016), “Erkeklerle Kadını Birbirlerine Rakip Olarak Gören Anlayışı Reddediyoruz”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/44278/erkeklerle-kadini-birbirlerine-rakip-olarak-goren-anlayisi-reddediyoruz.html> (26.07.2025).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (08.03.2018), “Kadın, tüm insanlığın ilk öğretmenidir”, <https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/91690/kadin-tum-insanligin-ilk-ogretmenidir> (20.04.2025).

Söğütlü, İlyas (2010), “Türk Modernleşmesinde Midhat Paşa”, C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 11, 1, <https://kutuphane.dogus.edu.tr/mvt/pdf.php> (04.10.2021).

Srinivasan, Amia (2021), *The Right to Sex: Feminism in the Twenty-First Century* (Bloomsbury Publishing).

Sumbas, Yavaşoğlu (2015), “Kadının Politik Temsil Meselesi Üzerine Bir Tartışma”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 53: 103–121.

Sunstein, Cass Robert (2014), “The Paternalist’s Toolbox”, Sunstein, Cass Robert, *Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism* (Yale University Press), 51-86.

Süslü, Dilan, & Melek Halifeoğlu (2023), “Quo Vadis: AKP’de Kadın Temsili ve Kadın Kolları”, Akdeniz Kadın Çalışmaları ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Dergisi, 6 (1): 232-262.

Tahaoğlu, Çiçek (2013), “İlk Kadın Haber Ajansı: JİNHA”, <https://bianet.org/haber/ilk-kadin-haber-ajansi-jinha-136697> (30.07.2025).

Tamçelik, Soyalp (2000), “Osmanlı Devletinde Anayasalı Yönetim Faaliyetleri ve Mithat Paşa’nın Anayasa Taslağı”, Erdem, 12 (36), 1007-1032.

Tansel, Cemal Burak (2018), “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress”, *South European Society and Politics*, 23 (2): 197-217.

Tekin, Yusuf (2000), “Osmanlı’da Demokrasi Tartışmalarının Miladı Olarak Meşrutiyet Öncesi Tartışma Platformu”, SBF Dergisi, 55, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/36285> (03.11.2021).

Tezcan, Tuğrul (2010), “Şura’nın Kaynağı Bağlamında İslam Öncesi Arap Yaşayışına ve Kuran’ın Şura Ayetlerine Bakış”, *Dini Araştırmalar* 13/36: 87-103.

The Guardian, (30.05.2016), “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: no Muslim family can accept birth control”, <https://theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/recep-tayyip-erdogan-no-muslim-family-can-accept-birth-control> (30.08.2025).

The Qur’an, (n.d.), “Tafheem ul Quran, 3:159”, <http://islamicstudies.info/reference.php?sura=3&verse=159> (09.08.2021).

Tüysüz, Gül (2016), “7 Times Turkish President 'Mansplained' Womanhood”, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/09/europe/erdogan-turkey-mansplained-womanhood/index.html> (18.11.2021).

United Nations (1957), “Convention on the Nationality of Married Women”, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1958/08/19580811%201-34%20AM/Ch_XVI_2p.pdf (18.11.2021).

United Nations, (2004), “Response of the Republic of Turkey to The Questionnaire On Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action”, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/responses/TURKEY-English.pdf> (15.10.2021).

Ünal, Didem (2015), “Vulnerable Identities: Pious Women Columnists' Narratives on Islamic Feminism and Feminist Self-Identification in Contemporary Turkey”, *Women's Studies International Forum*, 53: 12–21

Üstel, Füsün (2004), *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde: II. Meşrtiyet'ten bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi* (İstanbul: İletişim).

Vielhaber, David (2012), “The Milli Görüş of Germany”, <https://hudson.org/research/9879-the-milli-g-r-s-of-germany-> (16.09.2021).

Visagie, Lize-Marié (2014), “The Power of the Ballot (Read Bullet); The Legitimate Emergence of Armed Non-State Actors in Africa”, *Journal of African Union Studies*, 3 (2/3): 27-46.

Waldman, Simon and Emre Çalışkan (2017), *The 'New Turkey' and its Discontents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Yeni Türkiye Dergisi (Ocak-Şubat 2014), “Yeni Türkiye Özel Sayısı”, <https://yeniturkiye.com/yeni-turkiye-ozel-sayisi/> (31.07.2025).

Yılmaz, Buket (2010), *1950–1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de Kadının Giyinme Davranışının Dönüşümü* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi) (İzmir: E.Ü.SBE).

Yılmaz, İhsan and Kainat Shakil (2023), “Gender Populism: Civilizational Populist Construction of Gender Identities as Existential Cultural Threats”, *Populism & Politics (P&P)*, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 10, <https://populismstudies.org/gender-populism-civilizational-populist-construction-of-gender-identities-as-existential-cultural-threats/> (28.07.2025).

Yılmaz, Zafer (2015), “Strengthening the Family: Policies in Turkey: Managing the Social Question and Armoring Conservative–Neoliberal Populism”, *Turkish Studies*, 16 (3), 371-390.

Zúquete, Jose Pedro (2017), “Populism and Religion”, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 445-466.